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Female labour force participation (FLFP) in the UK has stagnated in recent decades in spite of 
policies that have tried to increase the number of women in the labour force. This thesis uses 
system dynamics to investigate how various aspects of UK family policy operate and how 
inefficient policies keep the level of female labour participation from rising to the desired 
level. The system dynamics model developed to understand the dynamic behaviour of the 
system operationally indicates that there is a relationship between the labour supply of 
mothers and grandmothers due to the high costs of childcare in the UK. The outcome of the 
model suggests that the rising cost of childcare has too quickly outgrown the subsidies meant 
to stabilize the system in the past. This affects families with varying income levels and 
number of children differently. This thesis provides insight into family policy dynamics in the 
UK with a systems perspective that is lacking in the literature. In addition it also adds to 
system dynamics literature by providing an example of how system dynamics can be used to 
investigate issues related to gender and equality which is a research area where system 
dynamics has rarely been applied.  
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1. Introduction  
“Investing in women is not only the right thing to do. It is the smart thing to do. I am deeply 
convinced that, in women, the world has at its disposal, the most significant and yet largely 
untapped potential for development and peace”. Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General 
1.1 Background 
Female labour force participation (FLFP) is a topic that is on the agenda on many levels both 
for nation states as well as organisations, for a variety of reasons.  Some nations are obliged to 
create policy influencing the matter due to commitments to organisations such as the EU, the 
UN and the World Bank etc., and aim only at meeting these obligations; others have realised 
the potential for building capacity and harnessing the skills and talents of the population half 
that historically have been kept away from paid work. With this in mind countries design and 
implement policies to try and influence FLFP towards the desired level.  However, both the 
range and extent of the chosen policies determines the effect it has on FLFP. The matter is 
also influenced by a variety of political, economical, social and cultural values that 
governments may consider to a large or small extent before deciding on policy.  When taking 
a closer look at the policies chosen by different countries in Europe, it is noticeable that the 
policies of countries which aim only to fulfil EU requirements are by far less successful than 
those of countries which have taken the impact on gender and equality into consideration 
when designing their policies. Countries which aim for policy options that promote gender 
equality can be seen to acknowledge that each individual, man or woman, has a right to work 
(Lewis and Giullari, 2005). These countries recognise that in order to gain equality for their 
citizens, both men and women need to have the same right and opportunity to access paid 
work, and thus sees FLFP not only as a means for increasing the country’s labour force, but 
also as a right of the female population, regardless of women’s biological ability to birth 
children.  
The United Kingdom has gradually, throughout the last century, made a shift from a male 
earner, female carer model of family, towards a dual earner/carer model. This shift has lead to 
increased political pressure for policy on work/family reconciliation that supports the current 
model of families. In the United Kingdom, FLFP have thus been a key concern on the 
political agenda for quite some time. As a long term member of the EU (before the vote to 
leave in 2016), the country has been obliged to comply with EU guidelines and suggestions 
for social policy that influences FLFP. Every government since new labour came into power 
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in 1997 have had work/family balance on the agenda, and a variety of policies and actions has 
been made with the aim of reconciling work and family in a way that makes paid work more 
accessible for women, especially in the area of childcare. Still, considering the statistics, very 
little progress has been made.   
Thévenon (2013) identifies formal childcare for children under the age of three as the main 
driver for FLFP, which imply that childcare can be seen as the number one factor which 
singly has the potential to make great impact on a country’s FLFP. Yet, many states who 
invest in childcare as a means to promote FLFP do not see the expected results.  
1.2 The Problem 
Female labour force participation has been on the agenda in UK politics for several decades, 
and many initiatives and policies has been implemented in order to create growth in the 
number of women who partake in paid work. As women without children have high 
participation rates and average hours worked  (which are close to those of men) (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015) these policies and initiatives mainly target families and in 
particularly mothers (Emmerson et al., 2014). The low participation rate of women in their 
child rearing years brings down the total FLFP rate which has stagnated around 53-55 percent 
since 1990 (see Figure 1 below). Considering this stagnation in light of the variety of policies 
that has been implemented since 2000 it is striking that there is not more change in the 
numbers.  
 




Figure 1 will act as what is, in system dynamics, referred to as the reference mode. Although 
there is no dynamic behaviour present in figure 1, it is the lack of dynamic behaviour in the 
FLFP rate that is examined in this thesis; as the stagnating behaviour observed is a symptom 
of a failure in the dynamic social system that is under investigation. As it is widely recognised 
that a key factor for womens right and ability to access paid work is access to affordable, 
quality childcare; the UK has followed EU advice and focused strongly on childcare 
initiatives to support mother’s access to paid work. Yet, in light of the lack of change in 
FLFP, it is reasonable to suggest that the effect of the implemented policies must be limited. 
Why is that? When examining data for participation rates originating from different sources, it 
is apparent that progress depends on how you measure it.  
Some sources for government data, like the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), report 
FLFP based on purely if women are participating or not, regardless of if the percentage 
worked is 2, 20 or 100 (European Commission, 2015). This measure gives similar 
participation rates for women and men and therefore implies that the goal of raising women’s 
participation rates has been reached. However, reporting FLFP without adjusting for fulltime 
equivalent is a poor indicator of the actual differences in participation between the genders, as 
women are way more likely to work part time than men. This can mislead policy makers to 
believe that there is little difference between men and women’s participation and thus no 
problem to address. When benchmarking FLFP data from the ONS against the male 
participation rate, the impression is given that there are nearly no difference in labour market 
participation between the genders in the UK; yet, when taking into account that 40 percent of 
women work part-time whilst only 2 percent of men work part-time (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015), it is clear that there are indeed differences between men and women’s 
participation in the labour force that needs to be addressed by policy.  
In light of the above, the obvious difference that can be extracted from the data is the number 
of hour’s men and women spend in paid work. This issue is at the core of this thesis. Women 
are spending fewer hours in paid work than men when they apparently are willing to 
participate at the same rate. Similar numbers of men and women are willing to participate in 
paid work; still women are not able to work similar hours to men, even after the excessive 
policy pieces implemented to address the issue in the last 15-20 years. The childcare policies 




My motivation for researching issues related to how government policy influences gender 
equality and female labour force participation in the UK, has derived from an interest in 
gender research and UK politics. Despite the UK being a western democracy, there are large 
differences in gender representation in politics. Although the general election of 2015 saw the 
highest number of women ever elected into parliament at 29 percent, a jump from 22 percent 
from the election in 2010, women had never been above 10 percent representation in 
parliament until 1997 (Apostolova and Cracknell, 2016). The historical underrepresentation of 
women in UK politics could be one of the contributing factors to why the UK has lagged 
behind other western countries in terms of adopting social policy packages for the promotion 
of gender equality. Policies in areas such as childcare, parental leave etc., was non-existent 
until 1999, when New Labour came into power. Since then there has been major 
developments in spending on early childhood education and care (ECEC), but still a large 
proportion of mothers report that access to affordable, quality, childcare is a major barrier to 
work (Emmerson et al., 2014). 
Research relating to the case for government intervention in childcare in the UK has been in-
conclusive to date regarding whether or not subsidising childcare has an effect on the labour 
supply of mothers (Emmerson et al., 2014). Still, evidence from other western European 
countries, like the Nordics, has proven that there is a close relationship between access to high 
quality, affordable, childcare and high female labour force participation (Lammi-Taskula et 
al., 2012). An extensive report commissioned by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Emmerson et 
al., 2014) concluded that although subsidised childcare has a proven effect on child welfare, 
there is not enough evidence supporting its effectiveness in accelerating maternal labour 
supply in the UK; as the varying government policies implemented so far has not led to 
extensive results. The report points to how state subsidised childcare does indeed increase the 
uptake of formal childcare, but that this may in turn reduce the uptake of informal childcare 
instead of actually freeing time for mothers to participate in paid work. This argument does 
indeed make sense when looking at the statistics for use of informal and formal childcare that 
was presented in an annual report for the Family and Childcare Trust (Rutter, 2016). 
However, what this report does not consider is who actually provides the informal childcare.  
The research commissioned by the Family and Childcare Trust (2016) suggests that the 
majority of informal childcare in the UK is provided by healthy grandmothers below 
retirement age. In light of this finding, it is reasonable to believe that there is a relationship 
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between female labour supplies at different stages of women’s lives. This relationship has not 
been the focus of much research and few pieces of literature to date can be said to address the 
relationship between parental (maternal) labour supply and informal childcare provided by 
grandparents (grandmothers). As the UK currently has active policies both for increasing the 
labour supply of mothers, and for increasing the labour supply of older women (Gray, 2005), 
it is a surprise that the relationship between the two seem to have remained unnoticed.  
When considering the above in context with measures of child poverty and how women after 
retirement age are more than twice as likely to live below the poverty line than men (Price, 
2006), it can be proposed that the time women are spending working part-time or not at all 
due to childbearing and rearing, are causing a spiralling, negative, effect throughout many 
areas of society. Considering all of the above from a system dynamics perspective, by 
identifying the feedback loops responsible for the unfavourable behaviour, one may thus 
potentially provide important insights about the underlying causal mechanism.  
1.4 Research goals and questions 
The research goals of this thesis is to identify the largest factors influencing UK women’s 
labour market decisions and thus female labour force participation, and to find out whether 
those factors are related to governmental policy (or lack of it). It is also a goal to assess why 
current policy is not giving the expected result. Lastly, an analysis of whether ‘best practice’ 
of social policy, inspired by the Nordic countries, will be made in order to determine if the 
UK would benefit from adopting similar social policies.  
As a result of the shift in family model, international policy pressure, and a necessity to 
increase the total labour force, the UK has since 1997 gone from spending no money on 
childcare and early childhood education (CCECE) towards spending 0.9 percent of GDP in 
2014 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2016a). One of the most 
explicit goals of such policies is to make it easier for women to combine work and family 
responsibilities. An increase in the total labour force has positive impact on GDP and helps 
safeguard against issues related to the continuing aging population. Yet, despite the total 
expenditure for policies supporting work/family balance increasing from 0 to 1.5 percent of 
GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2016a), the FLFP rate 
seem to have stagnated with only a small increase from 53 to 55 percent in the last 25 years 
(see figure 1). This gives rise to the question of why the current policies are not working as 
planned and leads us to the main hypothesis of this thesis: How does policy influence FLFP? 
6 
 
H₁: “Inefficient social policies for work/family balance are responsible for the stagnation in 
development of female labour force participation in the UK.” 
An alternative hypothesis was suggested following the confirmation of H₁:  
H2: “A social investment policy package inspired by the Nordic countries can bring female 
labour force participation towards desired level.” 
This thesis will use system dynamics modeling to examine how the social policies 
implemented in the UK have not given the desired results. The social policy in the area of 
childcare will be the main focus as research implies that access to affordable childcare is a 
main driver for FLFP. In this thesis I will firstly go through the theoretical foundation needed 
to understand female labour force participation, mainly in relation to gender theory and social 
policy. I will then continue by providing an account for the historical development of female 
labour force participation in the United Kingdom in order to explain how the problem came 
about. Furthermore, I will clarify and define what is meant by social investment strategy and 
how it is related to gender equality and families. I will then follow on with a detailed 
explanation of the family policies found in the Nordic countries and how they are 
successfully. Next, I will continue with a description of the problem context in terms of 
female labour force participation, the current childcare situation, and policy influencing the 
two matters. From there I will give account for the method used and how and why it is a 
useful methodology for analysing such issues, before describing the system dynamics model 
and findings extracted from it. Finally, I will discuss the results in relation to the theoretical 




2. Theoretical foundation and historical development  
“The beginning of the twenty-first century is a symbolic moment to give shape to the new 
social contract on gender, in which de facto equality of men and women in the public and 
private domains will be socially accepted as a condition for democracy, a prerequisite for 
citizenship and a guarantee of individual autonomy and freedom, and will be reflected in all 
European policies... Both men and women, without discrimination on the grounds of sex, have 
a right to reconcile family and working life”. Resolution of the Council and Ministers for 
Employment and Social Policy, 2000.   
Traditionally the problems related to work and family life has been firmly grounded and 
legitimized by the theoretical perspective of what has been called a ‘two spheres’ structure 
(Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot, 2010). Implied in this structure is the division of public 
and private/domestic life into two separate spheres. Issues regarding employment belong in 
the public sphere, whilst issues such as care for the dependant and family organisation belong 
in the private sphere. Historically, men has dominated the public sphere and women the 
private. It is however, as argued by James (2003), a structure of division that has been socially 
and politically structured and thus can be altered accordingly.  
The UK, as a classic liberal state, has been hesitant to intervene in the ‘private’ sphere. This 
comes as no surprise as what defines the social policy of a liberal regime is that state 
intervention is seen as subordinate to the market and the family (O'connor et al., 1999). 
Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot (2010) argue that it is indeed the state’s responsibility to 
“reconcile and regulate the tensions that exist between the two spheres” because: “as the paid 
employment market (public sphere) depends intrinsically upon the contribution of women in 
the private sphere, it is important to understand the relationship between the two spheres and 
its impact on women, in particular women who become mothers”. The two sphere framework 
has been strongly challenged with the entry of masses of women into the labour market in the 
period after World War II, and as a consequence, women’s role is now both to participate as 
an earner as well as having the traditional responsibility of caring and the household. 
Correspondingly the concept of ‘reconciliation’ of work and family life (as adopted by the 
EU), was seen initially as a women’s issue. But as changes in employment, society and family 
(such as the ageing population, new family structures and loss of the ‘job for life’) has caused 
new challenges to arise, the issue of work/family reconciliation has gradually become an issue 
that matters to all people regardless of age, gender or position as carer, earner, or both 
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(Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot, 2010). Indeed, the EU (European Commission, 2017) 
states that reconciliation is a basic condition for equality.  
It is in light of the above that this thesis will adopt the definition of reconciliation offered by 
Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot (2010) as a “dynamic set of policies and legal provisions 
which focus specifically on the tension inherent in juggling work commitments and family 
responsibilities”. The policies in focus in this thesis will be considered from a gender equality 
perspective. With an overall view that the case for such policies does not just relate to helping 
women balance their responsibilities (by facilitating part-time work etc.), but that they have a 
variety of wider repercussions throughout areas such as children’s development and reduction 
of child poverty, as well as limiting the gender wage and pension gaps.  
2.1 A note on gender 
The UK has a strong history of gender inequality and discrimination. Women gained their 
vote in 1928 after marching for their rights for nearly a century, but by 1945 they still 
remained in general both poorer and without similar opportunities in all areas of life in 
comparison to men (Thane, 2010). This can be seen as a result of how women’s access to 
work, and the conditions of the work and its pay, were all strictly regulated (Davis, 2012). 
Women were forced to organise amongst themselves as the unions were strongly influenced 
by the patriarchal system and as such did not allow women to become members (Davis, 
2012). Regardless of the post-war economy heavily relying upon female labour, the politics 
and policies implemented were firmly grounded in a male head of the household and woman 
as his dependant (Davis, 2012). Up until recent time, policy and legislation in the UK did not 
reflect an equal view of gender. For example, women were not individually taxed until 1990 
and rape in marriage did not become illegal until 1994. Although women gradually gained 
similar rights as men throughout pieces of legislation in the latter half of the last century, 
women’s political representation in the UK remained well below 10 percent up until the late 
1990s. The low level of women’s political representation contradicts with research supporting 
a correlation between democratic rights and high representation of women in politics (Welzel 
et al., 2002). As the next section will show, the low representation of women can be seen to 
threaten democracy and can lead to a vicious cycle of ineffective policies. 
In the UK, as in most societies, more than half the population are women (51% (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017)) Considering this in light of a common definition of democracy as 
“a government elected by the people; especially: rule of majority” (Merriam-Webster, 2017) 
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one can discuss whether the current 29 percent female representation (a record high) equals 
full political rights. Gender equality is therefore, arguably, a predominant for true democracy; 
and thus gender inequality becomes an important issue to tackle to ensure the democratic 
rights of all UK citizens.  
Internationally, the promotion of gender equality is recognized as a major factor for 
development and change in less developed countries. It is on the agenda of powerful 
organizations and institutions such as the UN, the OECD and the World Bank. In fact the UN 
in 2010 created UN Women, a separate entity for gender equality and the empowerment of 
women (United Nations Women, 2017). The OECD likewise has its own gender initiative 
which aims to examine existing barriers to gender equality, promote gender equality in 
member countries and provide good practices based on reliable data (Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2016b). The World Bank also views gender 
equality as a key factor and states on its website that: “ The World Bank Group takes as its 
starting point that no country, community, or economy can achieve its potential or meet the 
challenges of the 21st century without the full and equal participation of women and men, 
girls and boys. Failure to fully unleash women’s productive potential represents a major 
missed opportunity with significant consequences for individuals, families, and economies” 
(World Bank, 2017b). Common to all these initiatives is that they aim to provide guidance 
and support to countries on developing policies that ensures gender equality and eliminating 
policies that are reinforcing direct or indirect gender inequality today. Indeed, the EU’s focus 
on gender equality in their member countries has led to a vast range of legislation on the topic 
throughout Europe.  
The historical underrepresentation of women in UK politics has ensured that women have not 
had the full opportunity to shape policies that directly affects them. Putting this into context 
with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which 
characterizes the UK as liberal, and Lambert’s findings that “Having women in power is 
consistently associated with more generous child care and parental leave policies” (Lambert, 
2008), which is the case in the social democratic countries; one can point to the UK’s political 
system and processes as a factor that hinders gender equality by limiting women’s political 
representation and therefore in turn fail to come up with policies that actually work for 
women. As noted by the Fawcett Society (2016): “At the current rate of progress it will take 
50 years to close the gender pay gap and a child born today will not see equal representation 
in her lifetime”. 
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Despite the UK’s involvement with organisations and institutions mentioned above, the 
development of women’s political representation has been slow and as a result the UK has 
lagged behind culturally similar countries on policies that promote gender equality.  
2.2 The problem of the ageing population 
One of the most prominent problems for European states today and in the near future is that of 
the ongoing population aging.  Due to a strong decline in fertility rates in recent times in 
combination with how people are living longer due to modern health care and medicine, 
countries are faced with populations were the proportion of people of working age is 
declining in comparison to that of the elderly population. Thus, a smaller in relative terms, 
working age population, will have to support the increase in government spending on health, 
pensions and social care (United Kingdom Parliament, 2016). The UK is currently spending 
55 percent of its welfare budget on pensioners in the form of health care and pensions. This 
amounted to £114bn in 2014/15 and is expected to increase with £2.8bn a year in the next five 
years (United Kingdom Parliament, 2016).  
In practice, as the working age population decline relative to the numbers of elderly, the state 
tax income will go reduced and public expenditure will increase (United Kingdom Parliament, 
2016). This means that in order to keep up the level of production and growth of the country’s 
economy, the state must find ways to prevent this effect. As the threat of an ageing population 
has become more prominent in recent years, the UK government has many options for 
policies to mitigate the negative effects of the ageing population. Policies that reduce welfare 
payments, improve health, and increase the working population has been identified as the 
three areas were potential policy could impact the most. Nonetheles, it is unlikely that any 
political initiative to reduce welfare payments would receive any support as the older 
generations are a main part of the voters (Melo and Stockemer, 2014). Policies that improve 
the healthy life expectancy (i.e. keep people healthier for longer parts of their life) would 
impact positively on state healthcare spending by reducing costs. However, one area where 
policy could make the largest impact to prevent the effects of the ageing population, is in 
increasing the working age population to keep up productivity and tax income (Börsch‐Supan, 
2003).  
This is in line with findings from several studies conducted on behalf of the UK government 
(see for instance Harper and Walport (2014)). For example, a report by the Women’s 
Business Council (2013) found that there are more than 2.4 million women in the UK who are 
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not in work but who want to work. In addition, there are 1.3 million women who wish to 
increase the hours they spend in paid work. Furthermore, the report estimates a 0.5 increase 
growth in GDP per capita a year if the full-time equivalent labour force participation rates for 
men and women were equalized. Kabeer and Natali (2013) offer a thorough assessment of a 
variety of studies on women’s contribution to growth in productivity. Their findings add to 
the wide range of literature that supports the positive relationship between FLFP and growth 
(Briar, 2006). Furthermore, Kabeer and Natali (2013) argues that women’s employment must 
be taken seriously as goal for policy and that women’s domestic work must be recognised 
accordingly in supportive policies such as parental leave and public provision of childcare.  
The UK government has on many occasions shown that they wish to harness the skills and 
potential of women in order to boost growth, and has since 2000 invested heavily in a variety 
of policies to support women’s employment in general. The main reason for doing this has, 
however, so far been related to the 1999 government pledge to eradicate child poverty (Ostner 
et al., 2008). Yet, the expectations of the state are not matched by the behaviour of FLFP.  
2.3 The expectations of state and families 
In the wake of major changes to the UK labour market, new conditions for employment have 
become the norm. As the economic conditions changed in the last half of the previous 
century, women increasingly took up paid work to compensate for the increased risk in 
employment and the loss of the traditional male ‘job for life’. Over the past few decades, 
further changes to the composition of families, and especially the increase in divorce leading 
to lone parent households, has led to new expectations and implications in the relationship 
between the state and families. A major issue being that the state has failed in reacting to 
women’s changing role in the labour market in a sufficient way. Women rely on the state to 
enforce their increasing attachment to the labour market, which is of crucial importance to 
their equality in both social and economic terms. On the other hand, the state is relying on 
women’s increased participation to safeguard against the negative effects of an ageing 
population. Yet, as evidence presented in this thesis will imply; none of the parts are able to 
meet the others expectations. 
2.4 Breadwinner theory 
Breadwinner theory is related to the work-family arrangement that reached its peak in the mid 
twentieth century (Lyonette et al., 2007). During this time the two spheres structure was 
accepted as the model foundation for society. The ‘ideal’ and ‘natural’ family arrangement in 
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the eyes of society and sociologist alike were that of a breadwinner husband and a wife carer, 
where both women and children were seen as a responsibility and dependants of a man. The 
male breadwinner family gradually demerged in the second half of the twentieth century, and 
was replaced by the model of family that has been known as the dual earner household (Lewis 
and Campbell, 2007). However, as argued by O’Connor et al., the influence of the traditional 
male breadwinner model is still very much pervasive. This is particularly evident in the UK in 
that women conduct exceptionally high level of part-time work (in comparison to other 
countries), and  most work very few hours (O'connor et al., 1999). 
Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) examines 30 European countries in order to establish what 
direction work-family arrangement has taken as countries move away from the male 
breadwinner model. Their findings place UK in the category of what they name ‘one-and-a-
half breadwinner’ model.  Common for countries in this category is that although women’s 
labour force participation is encouraged, the extent of social policies does not allow for 
women to work full-time; thus, women’s paid work is seen as supplementary but not as a 
replacement for unpaid care work. In the case of the UK were women increasingly report that 
they wish to work more hours but that they cannot access affordable, quality, childcare to do 
so; progression in the delivery of sufficient childcare through policy is contradictory and 
notably slower than changes evident in the social reality (Daly, 2011).  
2.5 The double burden 
In gender theory and research the double burden is a well known phenomenon.  It refers to 
how women have over time and in response to societal changes and expectations from the 
state etc., entered the domain of working for pay but at the same time keeping the same or 
similar amount of responsibilities in terms of looking after children and the household.  In 
practice this creates a double burden on women where their total hours of work, both unpaid 
and paid is a great deal larger than those of men. The double burden has been widely 
acknowledged as an important societal issue and as a result there is a growing body of 
research in the area. Hochschild and Machung (1990) terms this phenomenon ‘the second 
shift’ and their findings were similar to that of other research of the time; namely that despite 
their entry into the paid labour force, women continue to conduct the majority of household 
and family chores and responsibilities.  
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The double burden remains a very relevant problem today as studies have found that even 
though women have been increasing the hours they participate in paid work in recent years, 
they still conduct the majority of unpaid work at home (Lewis and Campbell, 2007).  
2.6 History of female labour force participation in the UK  
2.6.1The post war years 
After the war there was a production drive to increase exports and the UK faced a labour 
shortage, as a response appeals were made to encourage women to stay in the workforce and 
to take up paid work. Although the labour shortage was expected to be temporary, it lasted 
well into the 1960’s and decision makers began to point to married women as a labour reserve 
that would give fewer problems than the employment of overseas workers (Beechey and 
Perkins, 1987). Thus, the pattern of increasing employment for women became a trend. Still, 
most women worked part-time jobs and the work continued to be unskilled for the decades 
after the war. Despite women now being seen as a resource in the eyes of policy makers, by 
law it was still possible to discriminate against women. Women were routinely sacked upon 
marriage or pregnancy, and were barred from certain occupations. Women received less pay 
even when they did the same job as men. Mothers of young children were discouraged from 
working.  
Women continued to campaign for equal pay throughout the 50’s and 60’s, by 1970 the Equal 
Pay Act was passed and applied to public and private sectors where men and women did 
similar work. Yet, women in jobs that were gender segregated, such as secretaries and typists, 
were still paid low wages in comparison with men.  
2.6.2 Development from 1990 and onwards 
The areas of FLFP and gender equality saw arguably little development in the UK in the 
1990s. The conservative government who was in power for most of the ‘90s had little to no 
focus on social policy (Turner, 2013) as it was mostly concerned with political division 
regarding membership in the European Union. Despite little development in terms of 
women’s political representation, social policy and gender equality, the ‘90s was a decade 
where the views, attitudes and beliefs of the UK population developed tremendously (Turner, 
2013). These changes led to a new culture of higher acceptance, where cultural and social 
equality became of major importance. Thus, when Labour came into power in 1997, there was 
a political shift from economic to social liberalism. Turner (2013) argues that the changes 
seen in the UK in the ‘90s was not brought about by the politics and policies of the time, but 
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that it was instead a result of this gradual shift from economic to social liberalism; resulting in 
a “demand for equality, initially in terms of culture, with the possibility that it might extend 
into the political sphere” (2013) .  
In the mid ‘90s, the UK opted out of what was known as ‘the social chapter’ of the Maastricht 
treaty due to the conservative’s view that the UK was an EU leader in the marketplace and 
therefore would lose it competitive advantage if partaking in a binding EU agreement on 
social legislation (Her Majesty's Government, 2014). As a result, the social chapter applied to 
all EU member states but the UK until 1997, when the new Labour government agreed to be 
bound by the agreement. For the UK this meant that any social policy legislation that had 
been negotiated in the period of the opt-out, would apply to the UK without any option for 
negotiating to make legislation fit with UK employment practices. This spurred a wave of 
changes to social policy and rights for UK citizens.  
2.7 Social investment strategy 
After the UK joined the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, new terms came into the UK 
political discussion. One of these terms is what is known as social investment. The European 
Commission (2017) offers the following definition for social investment:  “Social investment 
is about investing in people. It means policies designed to strengthen people’s skills and 
capacities and support them to participate fully in employment and social life. Key policy 
areas include education, quality childcare, healthcare, training, job-search assistance and 
rehabilitation”. Although the UK has extensive policies in areas like health care and 
education, the idea of investing in people through supporting them to fully participate in both 
employment and social life through for instance childcare policy, was a totally new 
perspective of UK policy making. Underlying the European Commission’s definition are 
some important connections, mainly that key policy areas are linked. For instance, even if a 
country provides free high quality education on a universal level, failure in providing quality 
childcare that is accessible universally will lead to the education policy becoming less 
effective; as half the population’s skills will not be available during their childbearing and 
rearing years. Thus, the notion of social investment is highly relevant to gender equality as it 
implies policy that helps all people, regardless of gender, to participate fully in employment 
and social life. However, in order to succeed with social investment strategies in a liberal 
state, the boundaries of division of responsibility for care for the dependant (children, sick and 
elderly) between state, market and family, must be renegotiated.   
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Bound by EU commitment, the UK developed what can be recognised as a social investment 
strategy throughout the first decade of the 2000s. This strategy involved the implementation 
of a variety of so called ‘family friendly’ policies like parental leave, subsidised childcare etc. 
These policies were expected to have a positive effect on women’s labour market behaviour. 
However, despite extensive expenditure on such policies, the results are still lacking. In a 
2008 comparative review of family policy within the European context, Ostner et al. (2008) 
concludes that despite the UK Governments ambitious goals, the welfare state is still strongly 
reflecting that it is built upon the male breadwinner family. Furthermore, Ostner et al. (2008) 
argues that the move towards an individualistic state in the UK has been strangled because 
social policies are still based on the principles of the male breadwinner model of family 
arrangement. In practice, this means that women are forced to take on work that fit with their 
care obligations, and therefore do not have the opportunity to fully access paid work. 
The political commitment towards a social investment strategy is likely to be affected by the 
result of the 2016 referendum which ended in the UK pulling out of the EU. Although 
historically it was being bound by EU legislation that forced the UK to make efforts in the 
area of social policy, there still remains a strong business case for continuing the efforts 
regardless of the lack of results so far. Social investment is of crucial importance to all 
citizens but in particular to women. O'connor et al. (1999) stresses the importance of the state 
to afford women a minimum income, or at least the right to earn one, in order for women to 
have the option of escaping personal economic dependence. Social investment is therefore 
also of major importance to families as especially women’s full access to employment alters 
the nature of family organisation and responsibilities. To illustrate the impact of a universal 
social investment strategy the next section will take a closer look at the case of the Nordic 
countries. 
2.8 The Nordic Model of Social Investment and Family Policy 
The idea of social investment stems back to Sweden in the 1930s where social democrats 
argued that social policy was not a cost but instead an investment (Tilton, 1990). Although 
social investment today reflects ‘new’ ideas in international context, the idea spread 
throughout the Nordic countries in the last century resulting in the common welfare model 
found in these countries today. 
The Nordic countries are well known for their welfare strategies and their models for family 
policy. Although none of the countries have the exact similar system as the others, the Nordic 
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model of family welfare policy is a term used collectively about the combination of policies 
that are particular for these social democratic, Nordic countries. Each country has its own 
unique model but they are all different versions of the same political view; a view that 
investment in families and children creates productive and happy citizens. In political context, 
the success of the Nordic countries has over the past few decades been repeatedly brought into 
light by politicians and organizations worldwide as an example to follow.  
In general, what characterizes the family policies of these countries, are that they are all 
universal, generous in terms of paid parental leave, provision of high quality childcare, and 
that the policies are designed to reduce gender inequality both in the work place and in the 
home (Lammi-Taskula et al., 2012). In terms of gender equality, Nordic policy stands out in 
that policies are designed to limit inequality for both men and women, and as a result ‘father’s 
rights’ has become a key element for policy making in several of these countries (Kamerman 
and Moss, 2009). These policy features in combination has proved to be unique to the social 
democratic countries, and has lead to high FLFP and gender equality as well as low measures 
of child poverty (Jaumotte, 2004). 
2.8.1 Parental Leave 
Parental leave refers to both maternity leave (can only be used by the mother) and paternity 
leave (can only be used by the father) as well as to parental leave which can be shared 
between both parents. As mentioned earlier, the level of parental leave is high in all the 
Nordic countries. The policies for parental leave has been reformed and extended many times 
in all the countries since the first parental leave policies were introduced, and today appears 
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Table 1 - Leave length with income-related compensation in 2010 (weeks), adapted from 
Lammi-Taskula et al. (2012)
 
1 
Obligatory leave after birth. 
2 
Obligatory leave before or after birth, with or without compensation. 
3 
Six weeks in the public sector.
4 
As of July 2011, the father’s quota in Norway has been 
extended to 12 weeks.  
5 
Five days of father’s quota = a week. 
6 
With full compensation/reduced reimbursement. 
7 
With 100% or 80% reimbursement. 
8 
390 days (seven days = a week). To this , in certain municipalities, can be added the 
opportunity to receive a childcare allowance until the child turns three. Municipalities can 
themselves decide whether they wish to provide childcare allowances, and generally, 
conservative-led municipalities have done so.  
9 
In the industrial sector. 
10 
The father receives five bonus weeks if he uses two weeks of the shared portion of parental 
leave. 
11 
On might as well call at least six of these weeks “maternity leave”, because the mother is 
not allowed to work.  
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Table 2 - Leave length with income-related compensation in 2010 (weeks), adapted from 
Lammi-Taskula et al. (2012) 
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The motivation for the different types of parental leave can be very different and have indeed 
changed over time in the Nordic countries. Maternity leave is most often meant as a period for 
the mother to gain health after pregnancy and birth whilst paternity leave often comes in the 
form of a couple of weeks immediately after birth for the father to be at home in order to get 
to know his child and participate whilst the mother recovers after giving birth. Parental leave 
serves the purpose of allowing one parent to stay home from work for a period to look after 
the child, and can be either a family based right where parents decide who will take the leave 
or an individual right where it is non-transferable with a set time for each parent (Lammi-
Taskula et al., 2012). 
Since the Nordic countries’ welfare systems are built upon the concept of universalism, the 
right to parental leave is equal for everyone, regardless of income status, hours worked etc. 
However, the compensation in many cases varies depending on work status in the period 
before taking out the leave (Lammi-Taskula et al., 2012). Still, there is some form for 
compensation for all regardless of status (i.e student, unemployed, etc.). The level of 
compensation can be said to illustrate the value the society put upon caring for the young 
(Lammi-Taskula et al., 2012), and has proven to be of high importance for fathers uptake of 
leave. As men in general earn more than women, it is likely that if compensation is low, the 
family may see too large a loss in income if the man makes use of paternity/parental leave. A 
high level of income compensation helps this by eliminating the financial costs of men taking 
up leave. However, father’s uptake of leave also depend on cultural factors and as a result 
several of the Nordic countries are now operating with father’s quota’s. Father’s quotas are 
non-transferable leave that will fall away if not taken by the father. Iceland has the most 
gender equal leave policy of the Nordic countries, where mother’s and father’s both are 
entitled to 3 months each by quota in addition to 3 months they can freely share between 
them. In practice, this means that if the father does not make use of his 3 months, the family 
lose 3 months income compensation and is left with the option of the mother staying home on 
unpaid leave, or having to arrange childcare in other ways. Both these options carry costs and 
thus the most financially viable solution is for the father to make use of his 3 months. This 
policy has proven to be extremely successful in increasing fathers uptake of leave, and 
therefore also in promoting gender equality, which has lead to the reception of much attention 
internationally (O'brien et al., 2007).  
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2.8.2 Childcare Arrangements 
All of the Nordic countries provide extensive publicly funded childcare. This service is 
universal in that it is available to all children regardless of parent’s income or labour market 
status. The service is largely organised as institutional care and is delivered all year round. 
Although mostly a public service, the market fills in the gap between supply and demand in 
many of the countries without any difference to parents or children as the quality and the cost 
is similar in both private and public institutions. The focus of Nordic childcare is more on 
education than on care and is thus seen as a right of the child instead of just a service to allow 
parents to work. The child becomes entitled to a childcare place at an early age, usually 
around the age of one year or around the time when paid parental leave ends.  
There is strict regulation of quality which means that staff is higher educated and better paid, 
this again ensures a higher status for childcare staff. As required education and wages 
received has increased in Nordic childcare, it has become a more common profession for men. 
This is seen as highly positive, especially in relation to the gendered division of labour. 
Childcare, both public and private, is heavily subsidised and as a result the cost to the parents 
is low. The combination of high quality childcare and low costs, leads to a high take-up rate 
where most children attend fulltime time, public, childcare from the age where they become 
entitled. The table below show the average percentage of income parents spend on childcare 
per child in the UK and the Nordic countries. 


















Table 3 - Percentage of income spent on childcare, Adapted from Lammi-Taskula et al. 
(2012) 
Considering the table above, it is striking that families in the Nordic countries can have two, 
three or even more children below school age before the costs becomes similar to the costs 
faced by UK parents with only one child. Hence, when taking into consideration that many 
families tend to have their children within a relatively short time period of a few years, and 
that the table above show percentage of family income, not the percentage of women’s 
income; it becomes clear that, from a purely financial viewpoint, it may not pay to work for 
mothers in families with two or more children, especially in lower income groups. A 
combination of the above mentioned family policies, with specific gender equality legislation 
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on areas related to the labour market (such as gender discrimination in hiring/firing, work and 
pay as well as in politics (i.e.gender quotas)), has led to high FLFP rates as well as the highest 




3. Problem context 
“There is therefore a potentially serious conflict between two current goals of employment 
policy in the UK and possibly in the EU more widely; on the one hand the goal of raising the 
employment rate of seniors in order to improve labour supply and address difficulties in 
pension provision, and on the other hand the goal of increasing the proportion of mothers in 
work”. Anne Gray, 2005. 
FLFP has been identified as a key area for improvement by the UK government. Mainly due 
to the government’s 1999 pledge to eradicate child poverty by 2020, but also for reasons such 
as gender equality and the cultural changes to family structure and organisation in the last few 
decades. EU legislation on social policy has also contributed to the government’s increased 
emphasis on increasing the FLFP.  
The signification of child poverty in relation to FLFP has been crucial in the UK context. In 
2000 the UK had a child poverty rate of 37%, the absolute highest rate of child poverty in 
Europe (Ostner et al., 2008). However, after accounting for social transfers (i.e. tax credits, 
allowances etc.) Ostner et al. (2008) calculates that the child poverty rate drops to around 13% 
of all children in poverty. These numbers tells us two things, firstly that too many children 
live below the poverty line and secondly that what keeps a majority of children out of poverty 
is transfers from the state. As research has found that having parents in paid employment has 
a significant effect on child poverty (see for instance: Gregg and Harkness (2003), Lichter and 
Eggebeen (1994), Bradshaw (2002)), the UK government naturally embraced the idea of 
increasing parents labour force participation in order to combat child poverty; and as a side 
effect, reduce the number of families relying on benefits from the government.  
The likelihood of being poor is higher for children living with a lone parent (Gregg and 
Harkness, 2003), but this risk is drastically reduced if that parent is in full-time paid work. The 
same pattern is found for children living within couple households; if the parents are without 
work the child is likely to live in poverty, but if both parents are in full-time work the risk of 
child poverty is close to zero (Ostner et al., 2008). The key message to take away from the 
work of Ostner et al. (2008), is that the full effect of parents labour force participation on 
child poverty is reached by supporting parents into full-time work. However, in the UK 
context, the problem of increasing parent’s participation can be narrowed down to that of 
mothers’ participation as men are more likely to increase their labour force participation than 
to reduce it once becoming fathers (Davies et al., 2000). 
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The traditional model of a breadwinner family is no longer valid in the UK today. The 
development of women’s rights and women’s entry into the paid labour market created 
changes to the traditional family patterns. Today women have fewer children and they have 
them later than before; families come in many forms and it is as common with two parent 
families as it is with one. Women are receiving the same education as men and their 
expectations to participate in paid work are thus equal as for their male counterparts. The 
economy and labour market in the UK are no longer providing the ‘job for life’ as in previous 
decades, nevertheless the ‘family wage’ that came with it; and as a result, families are now 
depending on the participation of both parents in paid work.  As the structure of families, their 
organisation and division of labour has been changing over time, moving from a traditional 
male-breadwinner model of family towards a dual-earner structure, government policy has 
struggled to follow.  
The development of policy that directly or indirectly affects FLFP in the UK has been 
strongly influenced by EU legislation and directives (related to social policy, gender equality 
etc.). It is uncertain how the UK government will continue to deal with the issue after the UK 
will leave the EU which is due to happen by early 2019 (Dhingra et al., 2016).  
Together, all these factors have contributed towards the implementation of a range of policies 
and initiatives aimed at increasing FLFP since the early 2000’s. Common for all the initiatives 
are that they are aimed at increasing the participation rates for one particular group, namely 
mothers. Despite the variety of initiatives now in place (parental leave policies, subsidised 
childcare etc.) as well as changes to previous legislation to reduce disincentives (such as tax 
reforms), the effect on FLFP has been limited so far.  
Since the main policy of interest in this thesis is that of subsidised childcare, the next section 
will describe the current childcare situation in the UK by explaining the interaction of formal 
and informal childcare. Subsidies has been increasing since they started in 2000 but are still 
very limited in terms of the age of children qualified and the number of subsidised hours per 
child per week; the subsidies are therefore not sufficient in terms of allowing the mother to go 
back to full-time work without relying on other sources of childcare such as grandmothers. 
This means that mothers who rely solely on the subsidised hours for childcare can only go 
back to work part-time, for  a limited number of hours a week.  
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3.1 The current childcare situation in the UK 
As of 1990 there were only 59 000 nursery places in England and Wales, this is in comparison 
to 1.7 million places today (where the majority of new places were created after 2000), and 
explains to a large extent the historical necessity for women to leave paid work once 
becoming mothers (Rutter, 2016). However, today, due to major changes to the economic 
situation, gender equality, and campaigning by activists, all major political parties recognise 
that parents and children has a right to high quality, affordable childcare (Rutter, 2016).  
Most UK parents today rely on a combination of formal and informal childcare to get their 
childcare needs covered. As mentioned before, the governmental shift in 1997 brought a new 
focus on social policy; this also meant increased focus on childcare and supporting policies. In 
1998 the government introduced the first National Childcare Strategy (Campbell et al., 2003), 
promoting the uptake of formal childcare by supporting the creation of more nursery places. 
Although the intention of this new childcare strategy was to increase the use of formal 
childcare to allow parents (mothers) to free up their time to participate in paid work, the use 
of informal childcare still prevails as grandparents remains the largest group of childcare 
providers in the UK (Rutter, 2016).   
Despite the government’s attempts to intervene in the childcare sector, the market is still 
largely private and has not expanded with the growing demand. As a result, the steep increase 
in demand in recent years has pushed prices up to the extreme as the market fails to increase 
supply (Rutter, 2016). Simon et al. (2015) suggests that the main reason for the market failure 
in meeting demand is that nursery care work in the UK is low paid, unskilled work, and thus 
staffing is a major issue. This is consistent with the findings of Vincent et al. (2008), who 
describes the majority of the childcare workforce as young, unskilled girls who quit working 
in childcare once they find something better. Thus, the childcare situation for parents in the 
UK is a dynamic picture with three major issues to be overcome. Firstly, there are not enough 
formal childcare places available to cover demand. Secondly, the childcare places that do 
exist are highly expensive. Thirdly, the quality of formal childcare is too low, as this type of 
care work is low paid, unskilled and therefore low status (Vincent et al., 2008). In light of 
this, access to high quality, affordable childcare should be the aim of any governmental 
intervention.  
The next sections will provide more details around the different type of childcare that 




Formal childcare refers to childcare that is provided by the public or private market and where 
payment is covered by parents, by subsidies from the state or as a combination. In this thesis 
we solely consider childcare for children from birth up to school age, thus after school care is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 Formal childcare for under school age children in the UK is mostly provided by the private 
market, (91% in 2016) in the form of day-nurseries (Rutter, 2016). In addition the private 
market also consists of childminders who care for children in their own home, but this type of 
childcare provision has been decreasing in the last few decades (Wheelock and Jones, 2002a). 
The public sector also provides some childcare for this age group, mostly in the form of pre-
school classes in the year before children are to start school. Pre-school classes are usually 
given at school facilities for a limited number of hours a week and are government funded. In 
recent years there has been a large increase in government spending on EECC, and as of 2016 
the UK spent around 1.1% of GDP on subsidising formal childcare hours for pre-schoolers 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2016c). 
The UK charity The Childcare Trust has undertaken an annual review of the childcare 
situation every year since 2002. In the 2016 survey some of the key findings were that 
although the Childcare Act 2006 states that local authorities are responsible for making sure 
there is enough formal childcare available for working parents, only 45% of councils covered 
the demand from parents in full-time work. In addition, cost of childcare in the UK remains 
the highest in Europe despite the nearly £7.5 billion of government spending on subsidising 
childcare. Furthermore, as argued by Rutter (2016), the public funding of childcare in the UK 
remains extremely complicated regardless of increased spending, due to lack of changes to the 
underlying system.   
3.1.2 Informal childcare 
Informal childcare refers to childcare that is provided by other family members than a child’s 
parents (i.e. grandparents, siblings etc.), neighbours or friends. Although informal childcare 
can be paid for, there is evidence that the majority of informal childcare provided in the UK is 
unpaid care work (Wheelock and Jones, 2002b). For the purpose of this thesis we will only 
consider informal childcare provided by grandparents, and as evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of grandparental care is given by grandmothers (Wheelock and Jones, 2002b), we 
will for simplifying reasons only consider the role of grandmothers.  
25 
 
In a 2011 review requested by the Department of Education, Statham (2011) found that 
grandparents remains the largest single source of childcare for parents in the UK. This is 
consistent with the findings of Simon et al. (2015) who states that 31% of all childcare in the 
UK is provided by grandparents. In general, there seem to be complete agreement within the 
literature that the high level of grandparent care in the UK is a result of the extremely high 
costs of formal childcare (Wheelock and Jones (2002), Statham (2011), Simon et al. (2015)). 
Although this would imply that grandparents would provide less childcare if parents paid less 
for formal childcare, Wheelock and Jones (2002b) argues that parents see grandparents as the 
‘next best thing’ and suggests that parents will continue to call upon their own parents to 
provide childcare unless formal childcare is seen as better for the children. This appears to 
pose no problem to Wheelock and Jones who finds grandparent care to be given freely as a 
gift between generations. However, as argued by  Statham (2011), grandparents who provide 
extensive childcare, reports that it has a negative effect on their health and that they would 
reduce their care hours if it was not of crucial, financial importance to their children’s 
families. Gray (2005) in turn argues that policymakers has failed to recognise the conflict in 
increasing pension age, and the promoting of higher labour force participation for seniors and 
mothers at the same time. This, Gray argues, could result in a major crisis of care unless 
future childcare policy and provision succeed in accounting for the likely forthcoming 
grandparent fall-off in care provision.   
3.2 Governmental policies and its impact 
The governmental policies for supporting families and their interaction with the labour market 
have since the political shift in the late 1990s been strongly influenced by the New Labour’s 
‘third way’. The result is a strong emphasis on flexible working practices, especially in 
relation to working hours. The political thought behind promoting this flexibility was that 
parents should be able to fit work around caring for children (Kamerman and Moss, 2009). 
However, as argued by Lewis (2007), this flexibility has resulted in a gender differentiated 
pattern where mothers work very short hours, and fathers work the longest hours of all groups 
(40% of fathers worked more than 48 hours a week). This pattern can be seen as a vicious 
cycle between mothers and fathers working hours, family income, and childcare. As the 
family cannot afford to pay for full-time childcare, the mother reduces her working hours 
accordingly which causes a decrease in family income, this in turn makes the father increase 
his working hours in order to make up for the loss in family income. As women are likely to 
earn less than men, it is women who reduce their hours. Lewis (2007) concludes that this 
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pattern not only reinforces gender equality, but also that it contributes to more inequality 
between classes as higher educated, better paid women are more likely to afford childcare 
than women in low paid jobs. Thus, women working in lower paid occupations will become 
more distanced from the labour market. In light of the above it is clear that governmental 
intervention to increase access to affordable childcare, especially for lower income families, 
are crucial.  
Nonetheless, the governmental policies for childcare currently in place has received criticism 
for being a cluster of complex, insufficient, policies that does not cover the needs of parents, 
children, providers or the economy (Rutter, 2016).  Unfortunately, evidence suggests that the 
childcare system in the UK is complicated and faulty (Rutter, 2016). This is also the finding 
of the 2016 Childcare Survey which argues that: “... The Government is subsidising childcare 
costs that are caused by poor policy-making: shortages of provision and poorly-executed 
funding mechanisms for free early education. This is money that could be saved and re-
invested in improving the quality and availability of childcare. It also shows the childcare 
system is not working and is an argument for childcare reform and a greater channelling of 
state subsidies directly to providers”. This can be illustrated by the table found on the next 




 Level of support  Recipient group Date available Where available 
Childcare element 
of working tax 
credit 
70% of childcare 
costs up to a 
maximum of £175 
per week for 1 child 
or £300 for 2 or more 
children. Families 
receiving housing or 
council tax benefits 
receive extra help, 
amounting to about 
96% of costs in 
England  
Nearly 400,000 low 
income working 
families  
Presently available UK-wide 
Universal credit 85 % of childcare 
costs with same 
maximum levels as 
working tax credit, 
although no extra 
help for those 
receiving housing 
benefit  
Low income working 
parents 
Presently available UK-wide 
Childcare 
vouchers 
Worth up to £55 per 
week for basic rate 
tax payers 
Working parents but 
not self-employed 
and usually excludes 
those receiving tax 
credits 
Presently available 
but will not accept 
new applicants after 
2017 
UK-wide 
Tax free childcare 20% of childcare 
costs up to a 
maximum of £2,000 
per year, families of 
disabled children 
receive help up 
£4,000 per year 
Working parents not 
in receipt of tax 
credits/universal 
credit whose gross 
household income is 
higher than a 
specified minimum 
threshold but less 
than £100,000 per 
parent 
From early 2017 UK-wide 
Care to learn £175 in London and 
£160 per week 
outside 
Parents under 20 at 
school or in further 
education 
Presently available Care to learn applies 
to England but 
equivalent schemes 




Discretionary Parents over 20 in 
further education 
Presently available This fund applies to 
England but 
equivalents elsewhere 
in the UK 
Higher education 
childcare grant 
£155.24 a week for 1 
child, up to £166.15 
for 2 or more children 
Parents in full-time 
higher education who 
are eligible for 
student finance 
Presently available This fund applies to 
England but 
equivalents elsewhere 
in the UK 
Free early 
education 
570 hours a year, 
usually 15 hours per 
week in term-time 
All 3 and 4 year olds 
and the 40% most 
income deprived 2 
year olds 
Presently available England but 3 and 4 
year olds elsewhere 
in the UK also 





1,140 hours per year 
= 30 hours per week 
during term-time 
3 and 4 year old 
children of working 
parents falling within 
same income 




England but a single 
commitment in 
Scotland 




3.2.1 The impact on female labour force participation 
The lack of access to affordable childcare for families in the UK impact on FLFP in several 
ways, both directly and indirectly. As mentioned before, in families where they cannot afford 
full-time childcare, the mother often reduces her working hours accordingly. The reduction in 
working hours decreases further with the birth of a second child as having two or more 
children in childcare is likely to bring the costs of childcare close to or above the average 
wage for women. This scenario escalates for the lowest income groups. As a result, many 
women leave the labour force alltogether during the years of raising small children. Those 
who remain in paid work have a tendency to work very few hours. The labour force 
participation rate for mothers therefore drastically impacts on the total FLFP rate after 
adjustment for full-time equivalents.  
As a second implication, grandmother’s contribution as providers of informal childcare also 
negatively affects the FLFP rate. Since a large proportion of the grandmothers who provide 
care for small children are still of working age, their reduction in working hours also 
contributes to lower total FLFP. In addition, the recent increase in retirement age for women 
is likely to leave many grandmothers in paid work for longer which leaves them unable to 
care for grandchildren, this will inevitably have a negative effect on mothers participation 
rates under the current circumstances.  
In light of the above it is possible to argue that during the current conditions of childcare there 
is a negative relationship between women’s labour force behaviour at different stages of their 
lives. As mothers rely on help with informal childcare from grandmothers in order for them to 
participate in paid work, grandmothers reduce their hours accordingly. This pattern leaves 
women in part-time work for a large part of their working lives which causes them penalties 
in terms of career advancement, lower wages and over the long run; a great reduction in 
pension in comparison to their male counterparts. 
Given that grandmothers aged 50 to 69 who are not in paid work are the most likely to 
provide childcare (Gray, 2005), the plans of  the UK as well as other European governments 
to extend retirement ages and increase female labour force participation at older ages, are 
likely to conflict with their role in providing childcare, and therefore has significant 
implications for labour market participation by younger mothers and for pension acquisition 
and the financial security of mid-life women. 
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3.2.2 The impact on women’s pensions and female poverty 
The issues surrounding lack of available and affordable high quality childcare in the UK 
presented earlier in this thesis causes further, and arguably even more important, problems 
when taking into account gender and time. Indeed, the work of Ruspini (1998) suggests that 
women are by far more prone to falling into poverty than men, mainly due to life events such 
as the birth of a baby, the risk of lone parenthood, and the implication of such events on 
women’s labour market participation. Ruspini (1998) also offer a comparative analysis of the 
UK and Germany based on Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare system classification. Her 
findings were that the liberal UK regime facilitates women’s poverty as women are indirectly 
hindered in their uptake of paid work by the burden of care and household responsibilities 
(activities that the state partly takes responsibilities for in other regimes). As women are left 
to a large extent without choice regarding their participation in paid work in periods of their 
life when they are caring for the dependent, be it children, sick or old; they are left in a 
position where their social responsibilities leaves them unable to save towards a pension, 
regardless of their desire to do so. In the UK this enfolds in a pattern where women work few 
hours, first during their childbearing and rearing years, and then later in life as grandmothers 
who wish to contribute towards their children’s and grandchildren’s welfare by allowing 
parents time to work. With the current political framework for pensions in the UK, the 
working hours lost by women negatively effects their lifetime earnings and therefore also 
their pensions. As touched upon by Ruspini (1998), this problem escalates through a lifetime 
as part-time work means lower wages and less job security, which in turn means less chance 
of promotion and wage increase, as well as a higher likelihood of becoming unemployed. 
Periods of part time work or not working at all also means that women do not gain experience 
at the same rate as men, which contributes to the gendered segregation of women in lower 
skilled occupations, and also in relation to the gender pay gap. Although the current gender 
pay gap is standing at 18.1% (Office for National Statistics, 2015), it is the historical gender 
pay gap that has caused the accumulating effect resulting in one of the highest gender pension 
gaps in Europe at 43% (Bettio et al., 2009). This effect can be seen as the consequence of 
societal dominance of the male breadwinner model; as society gradually has shifted away 
from this model, the welfare state has not responded sufficiently with policy and legislation 
and as a result citizens needs have not been met. However, the true scope of this issue is best 
illustrated by looking at poverty after retirement age; where more than twice as many UK 
women as men live below the poverty line (Price, 2006). 
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3.3 Literature gap 
Although there is a range of literature on the influence of childcare on mothers labour force 
participation (see for instance: Briar (2006), Chevalier (2002), Thévenon (2013)) as well as on 
grandparent’s role in providing childcare in Britain (see for instance: Gray (2005), Statham 
(2011), Wheelock and Jones (2002b)), little work has been done on investigating the 
relationship between mothers and grandmothers labour force participation in relation to 
childcare practices. This work aims to add to the literature gap by identifying and highlighting 
the underlying feedback loop that binds together the labour force behaviour of mothers and 
grandmothers as well as offering a simplified analysis of the UK governmental policy of 
formal childcare. Furthermore, it makes use of the complete system dynamics model to assess 
whether policy inspired by the Nordic countries would be sufficient in changing the undesired 
behaviour of FLFP that is identified as the problem.  
In addition, this work adds to system dynamics literature by providing an example of how 
gender can be included when modelling for policy purposes; this is of particular importance 
as the failure to include gender can potentially lead to harmful policy that enforces gender 





The research objectives for this thesis will be reached by building a computer simulation 
model of the underlying feedback system based on insights from the above review of the 
historical development and the current problem context. The simulation model will be 
thoroughly described and analyzed in the model and results sections prior to the main 
discussion. The output from the simulation model will then be used as the main focus for a 
discussion that aims to give insights into how the system work and what major feedback loops 
are responsible for the problematic behaviour, as well as the role of social policy in governing 
the system. Furthermore, issues regarding feasibility, implementation, and the cultural and 
political environment will be discussed. This section will give a short explanation of system 
dynamics, what it is and how it is being used, before giving account for how this thesis fit 
with existing literature in the field of system dynamics. 
4.1 The system dynamics approach 
System dynamics is an approach for analysis of dynamic problems. It can be applied to 
problems found in a range of areas such as for instance social, ecological or managerial issues 
and it is considered a multidisciplinary field with practitioners using system dynamics for 
research and planning across a variety of areas. System dynamics is about how things change 
over time, it makes use of the knowledge we already have in order to create computer 
simulation models that shows how and why a social or physical system behaves in a particular 
way, by identifying the feedback loops that governs the behaviour of that particular system. 
These models can be used to identify ways in which to alleviate the problematic behaviour, 
and thus create policy that successfully changes the way the system behaves and steer it 
towards the desired behaviour. Thus, system dynamics can be a very useful method as it 
allows for testing policy options under different conditions and future scenarios without any 
risks or commitment for policy makers or stakeholders. The insights gained from policy 
testing and analysis of a simulation model that represent a dynamic system with problematic 
behaviour, can then be used for guiding the decisions of policy makers. 
Yet, despite the benefits of creating a risk free environment for policy and scenario testing, 
there are several limitations to system dynamics modelling. Firstly, a system dynamics model 
is designed to represent some aspect of the real world. As an implication of this, if the system 
dynamics modeller builds on faulty observations and conclusions of how the system works in 
the real world; the model will also be faulty. Secondly, a system dynamics model will never 
be a perfect representation of reality; it is a very simplified representation and description of 
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how a system work based on the modeller’s perception of how real world relationships are 
connected. Therefore, the aim when creating a system dynamics model is not to mimic reality 
but to create a model that sufficiently identifies the underlying system structure despite a great 
number of assumptions and generalizations. Thirdly, a system dynamics model cannot be 
verified and fully validated. The reason for this is nicely pointed out by Sterman (2000) who 
argues that ‘all models are wrong’ because of their limitations as simplified versions of the 
real world.  
It is in light of the above that the goal for the model presented in this thesis has not been to 
match the historical behaviour of the problem but rather to sufficiently highlight how the 
system works, and it has thus been of great importance to set clear boundaries so as to not lose 
the purpose by striving for added complexity. The ten step approach to model validation 
offered by Sterman (2000) has been adopted as the main way of validation for the model 
presented in this thesis.  
Although system dynamics is widely used for the purpose of policy analysis, there is, to my 
knowledge, few applications found in literature related to gendered issues in social policy. In 
general, there are few but any examples of system dynamics models that examines issues 
related to gender. Still, there are some excellent examples of research that shows the power 
and potential of system dynamics when applied to gendered social problems (see for instance 
Bleijenbergh et al. (2008)). 
In light of the above, this thesis will add to system dynamics literature by providing an 
example of how the application of system dynamics to gender issues and gendered social 
policy can provide a useful and clarifying perspective. Furthermore, the thesis also uses 
system dynamics to uncover a dynamic, social relationship that has been largely unnoticed by 




5. The system dynamics model 
The system dynamics model was built using the software Stella Architect and the details 
around it will be fully explained and presented in this fifth chapter. Firstly, the boundaries of 
the model will be explained and discussed. Next, the model will be illustrated conceptually 
through a simplified causal loop diagram (CLD) before going into detail in the form of stock 
and flow diagrams showing exact parts of the model.  
5.1 Boundaries  
The model has been built to illustrate the relationship between FLFP at different stages of 
women’s lives, namely during the years of rearing children below school age and as 
grandmothers later in life. As this relationship is very specific to the UK, the model is 
spatially bound in the setting of the United Kingdom. The time frame of interest has been 
limited to the years from 1990 to 2015. 
 UK women’s decisions when it comes to participation in paid work are influenced by a 
number of diverse variables ranging from social and cultural norms to political policies and 
economical factors. With the time limitations regarding the completion of this thesis, it was 
necessary to limit the scope and boundaries in terms of variables to be included. In 
consideration of these time limitations, the model primarily focuses on the relationship 
between the labour force participation of mothers and grandmothers in relation to childcare 
and any childcare subsidies from the state.  
Traditional system dynamics models show how behaviour changes over time, with the idea 
being to follow the element under investigation to observe how this specific element change 
and develop in the period of analysis. This thesis uses system dynamics modeling slightly 
different from the traditional way, as instead of following the same people/group of people 
over time, it considers a specific family type and looks at how a family with certain assigned 
attributes would be affected by policy at different points in time. Thus, the model does not 
follow the same family over time but consider any family with the assigned attributes and 
how such a family would be affected at different points in time.  
The model uses subscripts (also referred to as arrays/dimensions) to illustrate how different 
attributes of a woman’s life influence her decision/opportunity to participate in the labour 
market. As the use of subscripts makes the model more complex to work with, some choices 
had to be made in terms of what would be included. The three attributes that were identified 
as the most influential on FLFP was age, number of children, and income level and each of 
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these are represented by its own array dimension. Other attributes that were considered but 
excluded due to time constraints were for instance education level and relationship status.   
The model measures FLFP in terms of weekly hours available for paid work and a number of 
assumptions was made in relation to this. Throughout the modelling process it was crucial to 
make a number of simplifying assumptions. The main ones are listed below: 
 It is assumed that women will automatically offer any hours they have available for 
participation in paid work on the labour market. In reality there would of course be a 
number of other constraints on women’s time that could lead to the choice of not 
participating or only participating part-time, like for instance the personal preference 
to stay at home with small children etc.  
 It is assumed that the decision to pay for childcare hours is purely based on how large 
the fraction of childcare costs is in relation to a mother’s income. In reality it could 
also potentially be influenced by the father’s income and factors relating to the risk of 
losing a permanent job if it does not pay for a small period of time. 
 Although the number of children a mother may have is considered in the model, it 
does not consider the age of the different children. 
 It is assumed that childcare costs the same for any child under school age, in reality 
this cost vary with the age of the child. 
 It is assumed that hours of subsidised childcare are the same for all children below 
school age. In reality the complicated childcare system in operation in the UK leads to 
different numbers of hours provided based on the age of a child, parents income level 
and local initiatives available such as pre-school, play groups etc.  
 Based on evidence from the literature, the assumption that if affordable, high quality 
childcare is available, grandmothers will not provide informal free childcare is made.  
 It is assumed that all informal childcare is provided by grandparents although in reality 
a smaller percentage of informal childcare is provided by neighbours, friends, older 
sibling etc. Furthermore, it is assumed that all grandparental care is provided by 
grandmothers although a small percentage of this care is actually provided by 
grandfathers. 
The list of simplifying assumptions above is not complete in terms of all assumptions and 
generalisations made, but illustrates the main assumptions that were identified as necessary. A 
variety of additional assumptions was left out of this list on the basis that, due to the scope of 
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the problem, the list would become incredibly long if all simplifying assumptions was to be 
included. 
5.2 The main feedback loops 
As mentioned in the previous section, FLFP is influenced by a variety of conditions and 
processes that it would have been possible to include in the model. However, the model 
boundaries set out above, lead to the development of a model structure that successfully 
captures the main dynamics of the relationship in question in a clear and simple way that 
facilitates understanding. A simplification of the conceptual foundation for the model is 




Figure 2 – Simplified causal loop diagram  
The CLD shows the three major feedback loops that together govern the relationship between 
mothers and grandmothers labour force behaviour. The loop named R1 is a reinforcing 
feedback loop that illustrates how an increase in mothers’ available work hours through 
subsidised childcare, leads to higher income per hour based on the assumption that a full-time 
job pay better than part-time. An increase in income reduces the “childcare cost fraction” 
which works as a comparison of the hourly costs for childcare with the hourly income of 
mothers. The “childcare cost fraction” has an effect on the self financed work hours a mother 
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has available under the assumption that, if a mother earn the same per hour as it costs for 
childcare, she will not have any self financed hours available, as it would not pay for her to 
work those hours. An increase in the “effect of CCCF on SFWHA” causes an increase in the 
“self financed work hours available” and hence an increase in the “total work hours 
available”, this again leads the “average work participation” to increase and yet again the 
“average hourly income mothers” will rise.    
The second loop is a major balancing loop, B2, which illustrates the provision of informal 
childcare by grandmothers. Here, the “desired change in childcare hours provided by 
grandmothers” is influenced by the “percentage of family income spent on childcare” which 
aims to represent the decision rule that grandmothers provide childcare hours in 
correspondence with the financial situation of her family. The “desired change in childcare 
hours provided by grandmothers” is also influenced by the “actual childcare hours covered by 
grandmothers”; an increase in the “percentage of family income spent on childcare” triggers 
an increase in the “desired change in childcare hours provided by grandmothers” which in 
turn increases the “actual childcare hours covered by grandmothers”. The increase in “actual 
childcare hours covered by grandmothers” leads to a reduction in “average work participation 
grandmothers”. 
The two major loops described above interact through a large balancing loop, (B2 in figure 2). 
This loop influences the “desired change in childcare hours provided by grandmothers” 
through the impact a change in “average hourly income mothers” has on “family income” 
and, therefore, also on the “percentage of family income spent on childcare”. As the 
“percentage of family income spent on childcare” is reduced by the reinforcing behaviour 
found in R1, the “desired change in childcare hours provided by grandmothers” goes down 
and triggers B1 to a drop in “actual childcare hours provided by grandmothers”. As a drop in 
free childcare hours provided by grandmothers mean an increase in the hours parents need to 
self finance, the “hours to self finance” increase and causes a reduction in “self financed work 
hours available”, thus the reinforcing behaviour of R1 is staggered by the balancing behaviour 
of B2. 
5.3 The model structure 
This section will firstly go through the details regarding the different array subscripts used in 
the model and how these contribute to the level of complexity in the model. Next the model 
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will be thoroughly explained by going through stock and flow diagrams of each part of the 
model.  
5.3.1 The array subscripts 
Arrays are used to give the model different layers, each representing a different 
dimension/attribute. Each dimension is divided into several elements which represent the 
different variations available. The model has three dimensions, age group, income level and 
number of children below school age which are all fully explained below.  
Age group 
The age group dimension is split into three different elements, namely “16 to 25”, “26 to 35” 
and “36 to 45”. These three age groups cover the average fertile years for a woman. This 
dimension was included to represent how the conditions surrounding a mothers decision to 
participate in paid work or not changes with age. For example will the chance of any 
grandparent being below retirement age be much higher for a mother who is in the age group 
16 to 25 than for a mother who is in the age group 36 to 45.  
Income Level 
The income level dimension is also split into three different elements: low, medium and high 
income. This dimension was included to represent how a family’s income level impacts on a 
mother’s labour force participation. For instance will the “childcare cost fraction” be much 
higher for a mother in a low income family and thus she will have less incentive to work than 
mothers in higher income groups.  
Number of children below school age 
The dimension called number of children below school age refers to how many children a 
mother may have between 0 and 5 years of age. The elements of this dimension range from 1 
to 3 as it is unlikely that a mother has more than 3 children in that age group at the same time. 
This dimension was included to illustrate how the presence of any additional children means 
higher childcare costs and thus influences the “childcare costs fraction” and therefore also 
mothers decisions to work.  
These three dimensions work together to give insights into mothers labour force participation 
under a variety of conditions. For each age group there are 9 different conditions depending 
on income level and number of children below school age. In practice this means that the 
model produces insights into mothers labour force participation for a total of 27 distinct 
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family scenarios. In addition, the different conditions also influence the decision of 
grandmothers to provide childcare and thus the model produces insights into grandmother’s 
labour force behaviour for the same amount of family scenarios.  
5.3.2 The model split into parts 
As explained through the CLD in the previous section, the model consists of several feedback 
loops that are influenced by each other. The following section will show stock and flow 
diagrams of the different loops and explain how they are connected.  
Figure 3 below shows a stock and flow diagram of the mothers work participation loop, this 
loop is responsible for adjusting mothers work participation hours.  
 





The work participation is determined by the variable “total work hours available” which add 
up the “hours covered by subsidised childcare” and the “self financed work hours available”. 
The “self financed work hours available” is determined by the stock “hours to self finance” 
multiplied with the “effect of the CCCF on SFWHA” (effect of childcare cost fraction on self-
financed work hours available). This effect is based on the assumption that mothers who earn 
less or just above childcare costs are unlikely to pay for any childcare hours as in practice it 
does not pay for them to do so whereas the decisions of mothers who earn 50% or more than 
their childcare costs are unlikely to be forced to reduce their hours due to them being unable 
to afford childcare or it not paying to work. The “childcare cost fraction” divides the 
“childcare costs per child per hour” on “average hourly income mothers”. “Average hourly 
income mothers” is given by “reference hourly income women” which is based on the 
“average hourly income men” but adjusted for gender difference in accordance with the 
historical gender pay gap, the reference income is influenced by an “effect of average work 
participation on average hourly income” in order to give “average hourly income mothers”. 
The “effect of average work participation on mothers average hourly income” represent the 
assumption that the larger the number of hours you participate in paid work, the higher the 
percentage job position you hold, the higher position percentage the higher the wage and is 
thus given by the stock “average work participation mothers”. This stock changes through the 
flow of “average work participation adjustment” which is affected by the variable “time to 
adjust work participation” which is one year, as well as the variable “work participation” 






Figure 4 – Stock and flow diagram of grandmothers’ work participation loop   
In figure 4 above we can see how the mothers work participation loop is influenced by the 
grandmothers’ work participation loop through the connection of the stock of “hours to self 
finance”. The variable “residual hours to self-finance” deducts the “actual childcare hours 
covered by grandmothers” and the “hours covered by subsidised childcare” from the 
“standard work week” (40 hours) in order to give the actual number of hours parents have to 
self-finance for them to hold full time work under the assumption that the parent which hours 
it will compromise is the mother. The “desired hours to self-finance” changes the stock of 
“hours to self finance” through the flow called “change in SF hours”, this flow is also affected 
by the variable “time to adjust hours to self finance” which is set to one year. “Residual hours 
to self finance” is as mentioned before influenced by the stock “actual childcare hours 
covered by grandmothers”, this stock changes through the flow of “adjustment of 
grandmothers CC hours”. This flow is influenced by a “time to adjust childcare hours covered 
by grandmothers” of one year, as well as by the variable “desired cc hours to be covered by 
grandmothers”. “Desired cc hours to be covered by grandmothers” multiplies the “actual 
childcare hours covered by grandmothers” with the “effect of PFI spent on CC on 
grandmothers CC hours decisions”. This effect is based on the assumption that the higher the 
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percentage of total family income is spent on childcare the more likely grandmothers are to 
provide childcare, it as arrayed and gives a different effect for the different levels of income 
as theory suggests grandmothers of low income families provide more childcare and 
grandmothers of high income families provide less. The stock of “average work participation 
grandmothers” changes through the flow called “adjustment of grandmothers work 
participation”, which in turn is affected by the “time to adjust work participation 
grandmothers” which is an estimate of two years, and by a variable called “work participation 
grandmothers”. The variable “work participation grandmothers” deducts the “actual childcare 
hours covered by grandmothers” from the “standard work week” to give the hours 
grandmothers have available for work. It is built as a graphical effect built on the assumption 
that the more hours you have available the more you work but that if you only have very few 
hours available you may choose to not work at all as the effort to do so is to large compared to 
the gain. It is also based on the assumption that even though grandmothers may have a full 
standard work week available they may work less due to other constraints i.e. part-time work 




In figure 5 below we can see how the two loops of mothers and grandmothers work 
participation interacts through the” effect of PFI spent on childcare on grandmothers childcare 
hours decisions” which uses the “percentage of family income spent on childcare” as input. 
The “percentage of family income spent on childcare” divides the “weekly childcare costs” on 
the “family income” and multiplies with the variable “percentage” (100). “Weekly childcare 
cost” multiplies the “childcare cost per child per hour” with “hours to self finance” and 
adjusts for number of children in the family. “Family income” adds together the average 
weekly income of women and men to give the total family income. “Average weekly income 
men” multiplies the exogenous variable “average hourly income men” with the “standard 
work week” whilst “average weekly income women” multiplies “average hourly income 
mothers” with the stock “average work participation mothers”.  
 
Figure 5 – Stock and flow diagram of the connection between the mothers and grandmothers 
work participation loops through the effect of percentage of family income spent on childcare 
on grandmother’s childcare hours decisions   
A stock and flow diagram of the model in its entirety is available in Appendix A. 
44 
 
5.3 Validation and model testing 
As long established by leaders within the field of system dynamics, models cannot be fully 
validated or verified as they are very limited and simplified representations of reality; thus 
models do not represent the truth and cannot be proven (Sterman, 2000). However, despite the 
view that “all models are wrong” (Sterman, 2002), Sterman logically argues for continuous 
testing throughout the modeling process in order to uncover any modeling errors or flaws in 
the models design. In light of this, Sterman’s idea about “reflective modeling” was adopted in 
the modeling process of this thesis and testing was performed continuously through the 
modeling steps. Due to the particular context in which the model was built some tests was 
more useful and applicable than others. The tests that were conducted were based on the 
suggestions by Sterman (2000) and will each be explained individually. 
Dimensional consistency 
The model was built using the idea of dimensional consistency from the very first variable 
added. Each variable added was reflected upon to make sure of its real world meaning, these 
steps ensured that any variable created was a logical addition to the model and that each 
equation was dimensionally consistent before implemented. To ensure dimensional 
consistency the unit tools in the modeling software was used in addition to human inspection 
of the logic in all variables and their respective equations.  
Parameter assessment 
As all model parameters have real world counterparts their values was mostly identified via 
extended archive searches in order to find numerical knowledge of the system. This was 
sufficient in order find values for variables related to wages and income, hours worked etc. 
However, some parameter values, such as adjustment times, had to be established using logic 
and reason. In these cases partial model tests was used to calibrate the system.  
Structure assessment 
As the purpose of this thesis is to highlight a relationship largely overlooked in literature, the 
structure of the system had to be established largely by extracting information about different 
system parts from a wide range of different theoretical and statistical sources (see chapter 2 
and 3). Each of these sources provided small amounts of relevant knowledge about the 
structure of the system which was then together used to build the model structure.   
Extreme conditions 
The model was tested with extreme conditions at several stages during the modeling process. 
The constants referring to income, hours of work and subsidies were tested for large shocks 
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using a “step” function as well as tests for behaviour during the circumstance of 0. These tests 
proved extremely useful and helped uncover faults in the models equations.  
Boundary adequacy 
The model includes the work participation of both mothers and grandmothers as endogenous 
in the model. The policy of subsidised childcare hours are not modelled endogenously as the 
purpose of the thesis is not to suggest policy but rather to point to why the policy has not had 
satisfactory effect to this date. Although it was considered to model the childcare policy 
endogenously in terms of GDP and the percentage of it set aside for family policies, it was 
found to be outside the time constraints of this thesis.  
Integration error 
The model was tested with the range of integration methods available in the Stella Architect 
modeling software as well as with a variety of different time steps. The model behaviour was 







In this section the behaviour of the model will be presented and explained through a series of 
graphs showing output from the model. First, we will look at the general behaviour of the 
model before taking a closer look at some specific examples relating to different family 
scenarios before touching upon policy and its implications. Lastly, the model’s limitations 
will be discussed. Note that the results presented in this chapter refer to a range of 
hypothetical family scenarios and how work participation of mothers and grandmothers in 
these families respond to the policy of subsidised childcare. These hypothetical family 
scenarios are highly simplified representations, and as such, do not conform to reality. 
6.1 General model behaviour 
The reference mode presented in the introduction shows the total female labour force 
participation rate from 1990 to 2015 adjusted for full-time equivalent. The data used as base 
for the reference mode is publicly available, but unfortunately it was not possible to source 
any data that separate female labour force participation by age groups, presence of children, 
actual number of hours worked, and marital status. This made it necessary to estimate initial 
values based on the assumptions presented in the previous chapter. This, in combination with 
the model’s focus being on a very particular group of women, namely mothers of children 
below school age in a two parent relationship and the grandmothers in such families who are 
active in the labour force; implies that the model behaviour cannot easily be compared to the 
reference mode and the results must, for these and other reasons, not be confused with reality. 
Yet, the model behaviour does give useful insights into how mothers and grandmothers work 
participation is affected by the presence of subsidised childcare hours, and how subsidies 
affect mothers differently based on the circumstances of their life. 
The general model behaviour is in accordance with the theory and concepts presented in 
chapter 2. The average work participation of mothers varies greatly depending on their 
income. The number of children a mother has (referring to the number of children aged 0-5) 
also influence her work participation. Mothers work participation is determined by the 
number of hours they have available for paid work (i.e. the number of hours they are able to 
access care for their children). The family income level greatly affects this, and mothers in 
low income families therefore work the least as they cannot afford to pay for many hours of 
childcare and thus rely on the hours grandmothers can provide. Hence, grandmothers in low 
income families work the least hours, as the incentive for them to reduce their hours to 
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provide childcare is large because of the high percentage of family income that low income 
families need to spend on childcare in order for the mother to participate in paid work. 
The greater the number of children a mother has below school age, the fewer hours she works. 
This holds true for all age groups and income levels. However, the higher a mother’s income 
is, the less her number of children affects work participation. This reflects the findings of 
Viitanen (2005) that higher income mothers can afford childcare and thus are less likely to 
reduce work hours due to the financial impact of childcare costs.  
The main result that will be discussed when trying to answer the research questions is the 
impact of subsidised childcare hours on the work participation of mothers from different 
family types and with different numbers of children.   
6.1.1 The case of low income families 
In figure 6 below we can observe how the work participation of mothers in low income 
families develop throughout the period of analysis.  
 
Figure 6 – Average work participation mothers of low income families by age group and 
number of children 
During the period before subsidies start in 2000, work participation is 13 hours a week or less 
for all low income mothers regardless of age group or number of children. The 15 hours of 
subsidised childcare per child available from year 2000 causes a steep increase in work 
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participation during the first few years of the policy. However, the effect is much greater for 
mothers with only one child than for mothers with two or three children below school age. 
The exemption is mothers aged 36 to 45 with one child as the grandmothers in such families 
are highly likely to be older and thus less likely to provide childcare. The reason subsidies 
causes a greater response in mothers with only one child below school age, is that the costs 
multiplies with the number of children a mother needs to cover with childcare. The more 
children below school age present in a family, the higher the percentage of the family income 
would be needed to pay for childcare in order for the mother to participate in paid work, as 
illustrated in figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7 – Percentage of family income spent on childcare in low income families 
Although initially favourable, the effect seem to fade after only a few years and after 2005 we 
see a decreasing behaviour towards lower level of participation for all but the mothers with 
only one child in the age group. This behaviour is due to the percentage of family income 
spent on childcare. Childcare prices rose significantly in the period, and much faster than 
wages. Thus, while the 15 hours of subsidised childcare per child caused the percentage of 
family income spent on childcare to drop drastically initially, around 2003 the percentage of 
family income spent on childcare started to rise again because of to the increase in childcare 
prices in comparison to wages. 
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In figure 8 we can observe how the subsidised childcare hours initially caused a drop in 
weekly childcare costs for low income families. However, by 2015, the weekly childcare 
costs had risen above the level it had before subsidies were introduced. Although wages also 
increased during the period, this was not sufficient to counteract the effect of the increased 
childcare prices. This is evident in figure 7 above portraying the percentage of family income 
spent on childcare. Comparing the development of this percentage of family income spent on 
childcare with the development of weekly childcare costs in figure 8 below, we can see how 
both these variables exhibit an initial favourable reaction to the subsidies in year 2000, only 
gradually starting to return towards previous levels after a few years, despite the fact that 
families are having to self-finance fewer hours then before. 
 
Figure 8 – Weekly childcare costs in low income families 
Grandmothers provide informal childcare as a response to families need. A high percentage of 
family income to be spent on childcare (under full formal care), works as an incentive for 
grandmothers to reduce their hours of paid work in order to provide free, informal childcare 
for grandchildren and thus give families less formal childcare hours to cover. The behaviour 
of grandmothers work participation and childcare hours covered in the case of low income 




Figure 9 – Actual childcare hours covered by grandmothers to children in low income 
families 
 
Figure 10 – Average work participation grandmothers to children in low income families 
As the above graphs show, the more childcare hours a grandmother provide, the less hours she 
spends in paid work. The number of childcare hours provided by grandmothers depend both 
on the percentage of family income spent on childcare as mentioned earlier, but also on the 
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age group the mother belong to younger mothers are more likely to have younger mothers 
themselves. In addition, the number of grandchildren present will impact on the childcare 
hours covered by grandmothers as it can be both difficult and tiring caring for several children 
below school age at the same time. In figure 9 we can observe that grandmothers in low 
income families provide extensive number of childcare hours and that these hours drop in 
response to the subsidised childcare hours available from year 2000. In figure 10 we see how 
the grandmothers work participation becomes adjusted to the fewer hours of childcare 
provided, and thus work participation increase in response. Still, grandmothers continue to 
provide some hours of childcare. 
6.1.2 Medium and high income families 
Medium and high income families respond slightly differently to the subsidised childcare 
hours than low income families. This is due to the percentage of family income spent on 
childcare being much smaller than in low income families (in most of the cases). When 
considering figure 11 and 12 below in comparison to figure 7 (which showed percentage of 
family income spent on childcare in low income families) it is notable that, in none of the 
sample families of medium and high income, the percentage of family income spent on 
childcare reaches 100 percent.  
 





Figure 12 – Percentage of family income spent on childcare in high income families 
Since the percentage of family income spent on childcare is smaller in medium and high 
income families, the work participation of mothers and grandmothers are higher in these 
families. However, medium income mothers with two or three children under school age have 
very low work participation compared to mothers with only one child. This is due to the 
“childcare costs fraction” which divides the childcare costs over income to give an effect on 
the “self financed work hours available”. In the case of medium income mothers, the rise in 
childcare costs that come with any additional children above one, cause such a large increase 
in the “childcare costs fraction” that it does not pay to work any additional hours than those 
that can be accessed with no cost, through grandmothers care hours or subsidised childcare 




Figure 13– Average work participation mothers of medium income families by age group and 
number of children 
In the case of high income families, subsidies have little effect on the work participation of 
mothers with one or two children as their income sufficiently cover formal childcare and thus 
their work participation is already high. However, mothers in this group with three children 
have very low work participation in the years before subsidies start as can be observed in 
figure. This is due to the assumption that grandmothers in high income families provide the 
least informal childcare, in combination with the total cost of three children in formal care 
being close to the average weekly income for mothers in this group. Thus, subsidies has a 
large effect on high income mothers with three children as the 15 hours per child brings the 
cost down to a level where these mothers has a large financial incentive to partake in paid 




Figure 14 – Average work participation mothers of high income families by age group and 
number of children 
Grandmothers in medium and high income families provide fewer hours of childcare than 
grandmothers in low income families. Still, some of the medium income families do rely on 
the free hours of childcare accessible through grandmothers. As we can observe in figure 15, 
the grandmothers in medium income families with more than one child below school age 
provided a significant and increasing number of childcare hours in the period before subsidies 
started. After the 15 hours of subsidised childcare became available in year 2000 the numebr 
of childcare hours provided by grandmothers in the above mentioned families drops 
dramatically. Yet, when taking a closer look at the graph in figure 15, it is notable that for 
families with three children the childcare hours provided by grandmothers starts to rise again 
after only a few years of subsidies. As the actual childcare hours provided by grandmothers 
impact on the work participation of grandmothers, the behaviour discussed above is reflected 
in the work participation of grandmothers in medium income families which can be observed 




Figure 15 – Actual childcare hours covered by grandmothers to children in medium income 
families by age group and number of children 
 
Figure 16 – Average work participation grandmothers of medium income families by age 




The childcare subsidies have little or no effect on the work participation of grandmothers in 
high income families, as they do not provide much childcare since the income levels in these 
families are too high to provide an incentive for grandmothers to reduce their hours. In figure 
17 below we can observe how the initial level of work participation vary slightly, due to the 
estimated initial values of childcare provided, before the average work participation for all 
groups stabilise at full work participation.    
 
Figure 17– Average work participation grandmothers of high income families by age group 
and number of children 
6.2 The impact of subsidies 
The results presented through the graphs show that the work participation of mothers and 
grandmothers in certain family types, were more affected by the childcare subsidies than 
women from other family types. More specifically, mothers and grandmothers of low income 
families, mothers with two and three children in medium income families and mothers with 
three children in high income families saw the most benefit in the years after the subsidies 
were introduced. The work participation behaviour of the mothers in these families can be 
observed in the example found in figure 18 below that shows the age group 26 to 35, in the 




Figure 18 – Average work participation mothers aged 26 to 35, families with largest response 
to policy 
Note that, in the example from age group 26 to 35 in the figure above, it is the mothers of two 
children in medium income families and mothers of three children in high income families 
that have the largest increase in work participation in response to policy. These findings 
suggests that the policy of subsidised childcare hours do not work satisfactorily for the 
families that needs it the most, namely all low income families and medium income families 
with three children.  
6.3 A note on policy and future scenarios 
The aim of this thesis has not been to suggest or develop any policy as the problem in 
question is related to the limitations of existing policy rather than the complete lack of that 
policy. As evidence from the Nordic countries suggest that subsidising childcare hours is 
indeed a very effective way of increasing female labour force participation (Lammi-Taskula 
et al., 2012), the goal of this thesis has been to investigate why the UK has not seen similar 
results as the Nordics despite the policy seemingly being the same. The model therefore 
represents the current policy exogenously, and merely changes the value of the exogenous 
variable that represents subsidised childcare hours to show how behaviour could change 
depending on future development in the number of subsidised childcare hours. Although the 
government have presented ambitious plans for developing social policy aimed at families 
and childcare in the future, the 2016 referendum vote to exit from the EU could potentially 
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lead to changes to such plans, especially in light of the current period of austerity in the 
country.  
In the figures presented on the next pages we can observe how work participation for mothers 
in the families from the example used previously, would respond to three different scenarios 
for future policy. The scenarios are as follows:  
 Scenario 1 – the hours of childcare that are subsidised do not change and remain 15 
hours a week towards 2030 (base case). 
 Scenario 2 - the hours of childcare that are subsidised double to 30 hours in 2017 and 
remain at that level towards 2030. 
 Scenario 3 - the hours of childcare that are subsidised are reduced to 0 and kept at that 
level until 2030. 
These scenarios are meant as examples to illustrate how the number of subsidised childcare 
hours has a direct effect on mothers’ work participation, as well as to illustrate how mothers’ 
work participation must reach a certain level before it has full effect for all families.  
 
Figure 19 – Development of average work participation mothers aged 26 to 35, families with 
largest response to policy, under scenario 1 conditions 
Figure 19 above shows the development of work participation under the condition of scenario 
1, the work participation of the mothers in the example families remains at similar levels for 
59 
 
most of our sample families. However, in the case of low income families with only one child 
the work participation is gradually decreasing towards the level of work participation of the 
other low and medium income families. It is only the work participation of high income 
mothers with three children that comes close to full work participation and which remains 
high in the time period.  
 
Figure 20 – Development of average work participation mothers aged 26 to 35, families with 
largest response to policy, under scenario 2 conditions 
Figure 20 above shows scenario 2, here the subsidised childcare hours was doubled in 2017. 
This is the most favourable one of the example scenarios; work participation for mothers in all 
the sample families increased to between 30 and 40 hours a week. Note that, although the 
model was run until year 2030 in the presented figures, the model was run for much longer 
timeframes during testing and the results of increasing subsidies to 30 hours seem to be a 
lasting effect which stabilised work participation at these levels. As the UK government 
defines full-time work as 30 hours or more, we may conclude that, with scenario 2 conditions 
full-time work becomes possible for all our sample mothers. This can be traced back to the 
percentage of family income spent on childcare; in scenario 2, no families spend more than 30 
percent of their income on childcare. The large increase in the hours a mother has available 
for paid work allows her to access full-time employment, and thus family income is increased. 
60 
 
The result of scenario 3, a drop back to 0 subsidised childcare hours, is found in figure 21 
below. Here we can see how work participation for the sample mothers gradually drop after 
the subsidies are cut. 
 
Figure 21 – Development of average work participation mothers aged 26 to 35, families with 
largest response to policy, under scenario 3 conditions 
For most of the mothers, work participation drops below the level it was before subsidies first 
were introduced in 2000. This is due to the relationship between wages and childcare costs. 
As both wages and childcare costs are extrapolated when the model is run into the future, the 
trend of childcare costs increases faster than wages continue. This means that mothers can 
afford fewer childcare hours than they could before 2000 as the gap between wages and 
childcare costs were smaller then. Of all the families used in this example there is only one 
exemption to this behaviour. The work participation of high income mothers remains high and 
does not seem to be affected by the drop in the subsidies.  
The general results and different scenario outcomes will be further explained and discussed in 
the next chapter. 
6.4 Limitations 
When modeling something as complicated and diverse as female labour force participation, 
many difficulties arise. Thus simplifications and generalisations had to be made in order to 
end up with a model of a reasonable size and scope, and that at the same time could replicate, 
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to some extent, the labour force behaviour and decisions made by women. However, the goal 
was never to create a complete model that fully explains women’s labour force participation, 
rather to use it to illustrate the dynamic relationship between the labour force participation 
behaviour of mothers and grandmothers and how it is affected by aspects of family policy. 
The model boundaries are very narrow and consider only the work participation of mothers 
with children below school age, who are in a dual-earner family and grandmothers who are 
healthy and below retirement age. Furthermore, the model does not represent aspects such as 
wages and policy measures endogenously. Other important factors, such as employment and 
government budget for childcare, are left out entirely. In addition, the model does not consider 
the constraints related to supply within the childcare sector or other aspects related to the 
actual delivery of the subsidised childcare hours, such as complicated processes before 
childcare can be accessed, costs, staff supply, quality etc.  
In light of the above, the results and the model behaviour must be considered with caution. 
Still, when viewed in the background of existing literature, the results do provide some 
insights into the labour force behaviour of the groups of women considered within these 







The purpose of the model presented above is, as mentioned earlier, not to replicate reality, but 
to illustrate and provide insight into a relationship that is largely overlooked in literature to 
date. The behaviour of the model does indeed show that there is a relationship between the 
labour force participation of mothers and grandmothers in terms of the hours available for 
participating in paid work. This relationship is strongly influenced by the social policy of 
subsidised childcare hours, which is evident when considering the reduction in childcare 
hours provided by grandmothers, as a response to the lowered percentage of family income 
spent on childcare after subsidies were introduced. Nevertheless, the initial positive effect did 
not last due to a second factor related to the increase in cost of formal childcare.  
This chapter will first discuss how politics and more specifically, policy, influences female 
labour supply. Second, the discussion will narrow in on why the effect of the implemented 
policies is limited, and how the policy in question is insufficient in providing the desired 
result. Next, the possible effect of adopting the Nordic way, seen as ‘best practices’ in social 
policy, in the UK will be discussed in relation to concepts such as child poverty, the 
phenomenon of the aging population and the suggested crises of care that could potentially go 
with it.  
7.1 The effect of policy on female labour force participation 
Political decisions relating to social policy and childcare policies in particular, have 
considerable consequences for UK women’s ability to participate in paid work. In a country 
where the male breadwinner structure of the family prevails to such an extent, causing both a 
double-burden effect for working mothers, as well as staggering development in gender 
equality and discrimination measures; the labour force participation of UK women remains 
limited despite a range of policy measures implemented. 
In order to investigate why the policies found in the UK have not given the expected results, it 
is necessary to revisit evidence presented in the theoretical foundation and historical 
development section (chapter 2). The policies implemented since New Labour came to power 
in the late 1990’s have all clearly been inspired by policies found in the Nordic countries, yet 
the results in terms of increased FLFP are nothing close to the levels reached in the Nordic 
countries. Taking a closer look at how the childcare policies differ in the Nordic countries in 
comparison to the UK, there are two factors that dramatically stand out, namely the level of 
subsidies in relation to family income and how the childcare is delivered to the market. 
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The first of these factors, the level of subsidies in relation to family income is present in the 
system dynamics model used in this thesis. The rise in costs of childcare during the period 
2000-2015 seem to have limited the benefit of subsidised childcare hours significantly as the 
percentage of family income spent on childcare keeps increasing instead of decreasing (or 
remaining stable). The large percentage increase in childcare costs, which by far outweighs 
growth in wages in the period, amplifies the argument made by Rutter (2016) that the supply 
and demand functions in the childcare market does not work sufficiently. Considering this 
supply and demand function in reference to the widely interpreted concept of the invisible 
hand (first introduced by Smith in 1776 (Smith, 2000)), the market does not respond as 
desired to the increase in demand.  
Supply and demand in the childcare market 
As supply does not increase in correspondence with demand, prices rise as demand rises 
towards much higher levels than supply. This leads us back to the second factor that is 
particularly different in the delivery of subsidises childcare in the UK versus the Nordic 
countries: the delivery of childcare to the market. In the Nordic countries, childcare is 
delivered through a combination of private and publicly owned childcare facilities. This 
ensures that demand is met as public childcare services are scaled up and down in response to 
demand. As most Nordic children are entitled to childcare after the parental leave period ends, 
usually when the child is around 1 year old, birth rates in an area can be used as an indication 
to scale public childcare supply up or down. In many cases, temporary childcare facilities will 
be built in areas which are highly populated with young families, and taken down once 
demand decreases as the demographic make-up in the area changes over time. Although 
demand is met both through private and public childcare services, the cost to the families are 
the same due to the simple structure delivering subsidised childcare: parents pay a fixed price 
regardless if the service provider is private or publicly owned. This is very different from the 
UK where childcare is delivered solely through privately owned childcare facilities, and 
where prices can vary significantly from provider to provider and between areas. The state 
funded subsidised childcare hours available are aimed at reducing the high costs to families, 
yet the costs have only reached such levels because of a lack of response to the increased 
demand amongst UK private childcare suppliers. Thus, the problem cannot be solved by 




Revisiting the research questions and hypothesis 
The argument made above provides a possible answer to the first hypothesis introduced in 
chapter 1: 
H₁: “Inefficient social policies for work/family balance are responsible for the stagnation in 
development of female labour force participation in the UK.” 
As the policy in action can be seen to treat the symptoms (i.e. high childcare prices) but not 
the underlying cause (supply does not meet demand), costs are driven upwards. The current 
level of 15 subsidised childcare hours per child per week (for children in the qualifying age 
group) is not sufficient because the percentage of family income many families will have to 
spend on childcare at this level, remains so high that it cannot be justified for many mothers to 
work full-time. Thus, many mothers persist in situations where they cannot afford to work 
more than part-time hours; or in the case of low income families with several children below 
school age, not at all. Therefore, mothers keep turning to grandmothers to supplement formal 
childcare with free informal childcare to keep childcare costs down. The few subsidised 
childcare hours available are not enough for parents to make a full switch from a combination 
of formal and informal care to purely formal care for their children and so FLFP remains low 
as both mothers and grandmothers participation is staggered by the inefficient childcare 
policy. This leads us back to our second hypothesis: 
H2: “A social investment policy package inspired by the Nordic countries can bring female 
labour force participation towards the desired level.” 
Although the delivery of childcare services (and hours) was deemed outside the boundaries 
and scope of this thesis, it seems fair to say that in reference to the proposed answer to H1, a 
childcare policy which treated the underlying cause (the supply side of the childcare market) 
in addition to the symptom of high childcare costs, could potentially lead to positive 
development in FLFP in the UK. Such a policy could be similar to those seen in the Nordic 
countries where the childcare demand is met not only by private companies but also by public 
childcare services where and when it is necessary. 
The model itself can be seen as an answer to the main hypothesis of this thesis which was 
stated as: How does policy influence FLFP?  The model shows, in a clear and simplified 
way, how the subsidised hours of childcare influence FLFP by increasing the hours mothers 
have available for participating in paid work. In addition, the model shows how these 
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additional hours of participation make the total family income increase, which reduces the 
percentage of family income spent on childcare and thus lowers the incentive for 
grandmothers to provide childcare hours. Thus, childcare policy influence women’s labour 
market decisions during several stages of their lives.  
How families are affected differently by policy 
The model results presented in the previous chapter illustrates how the current policies affect 
families very differently depending on the attributes of the family in question. As a 
consequence, it is the families with the least resources that are in the worst position. Many of 
the women, who cannot find affordable childcare for enough hours to participate in paid 
work, are in a helpless situation of the double burden; their children need care, but the family 
also needs more income to avoid of poverty. Hence, women desperately struggle to combine 
caring and earner responsibilities in the most beneficial way for their families. This double 
burden is frequently relieved by the intervention of grandmothers who agree to reduce their 
own working hours to allow their daughters to participate in paid work. The necessity for and 
use of grandmothers in childcare is particularly large amongst low and middle income 
families. In a low income family, with no grandmothers available to provide informal 
childcare, it is very unlikely that the mother can afford to work even only a few hours more 
than what is provided through childcare subsidies. This problem escalates with the number of 
children in the family and as the examples from the model showed, for low income families 
the presence of two or more children below school age will imply that in many cases the 
mother cannot afford to work. In light of the heavy reliance on grandmothers as providers of 
childcare, and the government’s acceptance and considerations of it when deciding on policy 
(Gray, 2005), the policies in practice today are truly unfair to many families and especially to 
those without access to free informal childcare. 
7.2 The mismatch in policy and desired outcomes 
The government’s positive attitude towards grandmother’s role in providing free informal 
childcare (without any compensation towards pension, etc.) can be seen not only as 
unsustainable in the context of the aging population, with the growing need for older people 
to stay in work for longer, but the situation also has normative implications. The 
government’s reliance on informal childcare in the form of grandparents, to fill the gaps in 
childcare that the government itself has not been able to prevent with policy and contributes to 
reinforcing and uphold of the traditional ‘male breadwinner’ structure, as it is mostly women 
who provide this free care work and is thus kept away from paid work. A shift to formal 
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childcare is therefore necessary not only to make a full switch towards dual-earner families 
where both parents have equal access to participate in paid work, but also in order to allow 
older women the same access to paid work as their male counterparts. Allowing older women 
full access to participation in paid work (without any informal care burden) would impact 
positively on pension inequalities and the poverty trap for older women.   
Although the factors discussed above may seem obvious in terms of what should be 
politically accepted there is a vast amount of evidence that suggests that the UK government 
has not yet found the best way to develop social family policy. Firstly, many of the policies 
implemented so far are faulty or insufficient when it comes to gender equality. Examples of 
this are the acceptance of and reliance on grandparental care mentioned above, as well as the 
very limited rights to paternity leave in parental leave policy. The states exclusion of fathers 
in family policy such as parental leave, reinforces the traditional ‘two spheres’ structure of 
society which implies that it is not men’s responsibility to deal with children, care, and the 
home.  
The lack of desire/capability to make policy gender equal may result from the motivation 
behind the policies in question. Evidence presented earlier in this thesis suggests the 
motivation for the policies currently in place has been mainly a combination between the 
government pledge to eradicate child poverty and a responsibility to comply with EU laws 
and legislation. Although reducing child poverty is a noble goal to pursue for any 
government, child poverty itself is a symptom of other underlying problems, such as gender 
inequality. In light of this, the reduction of gender inequalities in terms of access to paid work 
and economic rights could lead to higher FLFP and thus in turn less child poverty. Despite the 
government’s recognition of this relationship and efforts towards increasing FLFP in recent 
years, the motivation behind it may be the reason for the lack of results so far. When 
considering the evidence regarding the role of family policy in raising FLFP in the Nordics 
from chapter 2, it becomes possible to benchmark against the development of family policy in 
the UK. Such a comparison is useful in terms of assessing where the problem lie in UK policy 
making. In light of this one can raise the question of whether policies in the UK so far is true 
social investment or if it is a half hearted attempt, motivated by the wrong reasons. It is also 
possible to suggest that the underrepresentation of women in politics could be one of the main 
reasons why policies have been insufficient so far; it may not be possible to create effective 
policy without largely including the gender the policy is supposed to influence in the process. 
This view is enforced by the evidence from the Nordics, which suggests that women’s 
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political representation must increase above the 30 percent mark before gender equality picks 
up pace both in terms of policy and cultural measures. In the political context of the social 
democratic Nordic countries, the 30 percent mark was reached through a combination of both 
political measures (such as quotas) and the effect of time on culture itself. The evidence 
presented in chapter 2, suggests that the level of gender equality in the Nordic countries has 
been reached gradually ever since women gained their vote in these countries in the first 2 
decades of the 20
th
 century; benchmarking this development against the UK suggests that 
development there has stagnated significantly. 
The creation of policy is a political matter and will always be a product of the political system 
in practice as well as of the policymakers involved. Although the UK has taken a step away 
from the classical neo-liberalistic way of doing welfare and moved towards welfare policies 
seen in social democracies like the Nordics, the policies implemented have not been 
successful so far. UK politicians and therefore also policymakers work under the strain of re-
election every four years. This is very much reflected in the social policies found in the 
country which seem to have been created without the long term view of changing deep rooted, 
cultural and social problems related to family organisation and gender inequalities. It is, 
however, this type of view that was the foundation for the policies created in the Nordic 
countries, which has been gradually changed and built upon for decades before leading to the 
results we find today in terms of FLFP and gender equality measures.  
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8. Conclusions and recommendations for further research 
The aim for this thesis work was to use system dynamics to analyse to the FLFP of mothers 
and grandmothers in relation to social policy, and subsidised childcare hours in particular. The 
model developed this purpose is a simplified representation of reality, and as such, does not 
consider all aspects that affects mothers’ and grandmothers’ work participation decisions. Yet, 
the results suggest that the model provides useful insights into the labour force behaviour of 
UK mothers and grandmothers. Although childcare subsidy policies in, for instance, countries 
like the Nordics has proven effective in raising female labour participation, the policies 
available in the UK have been critiqued of being delivered through unnecessarily complicated 
systems; together with the highest childcare costs in Europe (despite the policies) this creates 
an environment where take up is limited to those who can afford the additional cost or access 
free informal childcare and where the mothers in families who need the second income the 
most, still cannot afford to work as many hours as they desire. In practice, the costs of 
childcare as a percentage of family income that would need to be spent on childcare in order 
to cover enough hours for both parents to partake in full-time paid work, is above the 
threshold where it pays to work for many mothers. 
The extremely high childcare costs are caused by a fault in the system mechanism that adjusts 
supply to demand in market driven economies, and therefore needs to be addressed by policy. 
Although the childcare policies implemented in the UK in theory are valid policies as a means 
to solve the supply/demand issues, the policies fail due to the fact that state funded childcare 
does not outweigh price increases in the sector, as demand is much higher than supply and as 
such push the prices upwards. The fixed hours of subsidised childcare available to families in 
the UK were intended as a means to increase FLFP in the process of combating child poverty. 
Unfortunately due to the fault in the market supply/demand mechanism, the fixed subsidised 
childcare hours only help stagger the negative effects instead of resulting in positive changes 
to behaviour.  
Increasing FLFP can be beneficial in many ways and for many areas of society. On a family 
level, increased FLFP can bring about a larger family income and as such, it can be a step out 
of poverty. Reduction of poverty through facilitating for higher work participation amongst 
mother’s can be expected to reduce child poverty dramatically. On a society level, increased 
FLFP can lead to higher gender equality which would contribute towards closing the gender 
gap, give higher political representation for women, and thus more democratic rights. 
Increasing FLFP also reap positive effects in terms of reducing pension inequalities and 
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poverty amongst older women. At a country level, increased FLFP will reduce the effect of 
the aging population and could result in increased productivity levels; with a corresponding 
rise in GDP. 
In light of the benefits of increasing FLFP and evidence from social policy research, the 
policies available can be deemed feasible; the majority of the issues are related to 
implementation, range and scale of the policies.  
Reflections and recommendations 
All things considered, further research is necessary. Not only to examine at what level 
subsidies will give greater effect for the low and medium income families who are relying on 
mothers bringing in a full second income, but also in order to investigate how the delivery and 
implementation of subsidised childcare hours can be simplified in order to improve uptake.   
There are many routes to take for future research into the problems relating to FLFP and 
social policy in the UK. Firstly, the system dynamics model in its current state of 
development only provides insight into a few aspects that affect FLFP and family income. By 
modelling the policy endogenously, one could potensially conduct a much more advanced 
analysis. Secondly, there could be great potential in adapting the model to the national 
economy level to show how FLFP impact on the country’s overall labour force and economy, 
and how the economical and political context influences social policy measures.  
The use of subscripts when modeling policy that affects particular groups differently from 
each other has proven extremely powerful. Yet, during the modeling process for this thesis 
work, it became evident that the software available could benefit from improvements that 
simplify the use of subscripts and makes it easier to work with the various dimensions in the 
model. At the point of writing, the software does not provide a sufficient way to quickly 
change, adapt and test an arrayed model. It was also disappointing that the software’s 
storytelling feature did not work with the arrayed model, hopefully this will be available in 
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Appendix B – Sources for model data and estimates 
The model uses limited data input due to the difficulty in finding data for the specific groups 
of women considered. Thus, the model builds on a range of assumptions and estimates which 
origins in a wide range of readings. The main sources for the data input and estimates used in 
the model are found in the table below.  
Variable Source 
Avg hourly income men Office for National Statistics (2014) 
Childcare costs per child per hour Hankin (2014), Viitanen (2005) 
Actual subsidised hours  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (2016c), Emmerson et al. 
(2014) 
INIT Actual CC Hours Covered 
by Grandmothers 
Statham (2011), Wheelock and Jones (2002a) 
Gender adj pct O'reilly et al. (2015), Leopold et al. (2016), 
Azmat (2015) 









Appendix C – Model Equations 
The list below gives the source code for the equations from the Stella model. As the model is 
arrayed, the list below only shows equations for the top level model. Due to the software 
adding all relevant dimensions as an ending to each variable’s name, the naming in the 
equation list became long and therefore also hard to present in a straightforwardly way.  
 
The model has 43 (805) variables (array expansion in parenthesis). 
Stocks: 4 (108) Flows: 4 (108) Converters: 35 (589) 
Constants: 11 (91) Equations: 28 (606) Graphicals: 7 (139) 
There are also 135 expanded macro variables. 
Top-Level Model: 
Actual_Childcare_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[Age_Group, 
Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level](t) = 
Actual_Childcare_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[Age_Group, 
Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level](t - dt) + 
(adjustment_of_grandmothers_CC_hours[Age_Group, 
Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level]) * dt 
INIT Actual_Childcare_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[Age_Group, 











Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level](t) = 
Average_Work_Participation_Grandmothers[Age_Group, 
Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level](t - dt) + 
(adjustment_of_grandmothers_work_participation[Age_Group, 
Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level]) * dt 
INIT Average_Work_Participation_Grandmothers[Age_Group, 











Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t - 
dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, 
One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t - 
dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 




Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t - 
dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 
Low_Income]) * dt 
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INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 




Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, 
Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 
High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 
High_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, 
Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) 
+ (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, 
One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) 
+ (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] 
= INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 






Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 
Low_Income](t - dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 




Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, 
Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 
High_Income](t - dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 
High_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, 
Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) 
+ (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 




Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t - 
dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, 
One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) 
+ (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, High_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t - 
dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 




Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t 
- dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, High_Income, 
Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 
Low_Income](t - dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 




Medium_Income](t) = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
82 
 
Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 
Medium_Income] = INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, 
Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) 
= Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 
High_Income](t - dt) + (avg_work_participation_adjustment[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 









Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 




Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 




Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Low_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 




Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 
INIT_Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] 
UNITS: Hours 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t) = 
Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income](t - dt) + 
(chng_in_SF_hours[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income]) * dt 
INIT Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 


















































































































































actual_subsidised_hours = STEP(15, 2000) 
UNITS: Hours 
avg_hourly_income_men[Low_Income] = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1990,00, 2,550), (2015,00, 6,900) 
UNITS: GBP/Hour 
avg_hourly_income_men[Medium_Income] = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1990,00, 6,500), (2015,00, 13,000) 
UNITS: GBP/Hour 
avg_hourly_income_men[High_Income] = GRAPH(TIME) 




















Income_Level] = Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers*avg_hourly_income_mothers 
UNITS: GBP 


















































childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Two_Children, Low_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Two_Children, Medium_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Two_Children, High_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Three_Children, Low_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Three_Children, Medium_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfiv
e, Three_Children, High_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 












childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive
, Two_Children, Low_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive
, Two_Children, Medium_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*2)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive




childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive
, Three_Children, Low_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive
, Three_Children, Medium_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_cost_fraction[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 
(childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*3)/avg_hourly_income_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive
, Three_Children, High_Income] 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1990,00, 1,600), (2002,50, 2,900), (2015,00, 5,000) 
UNITS: GBP/Hour 
desired_cc_hours_to_be_Covered_by_grandmothers[Age_Group, 





Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level] = 
GRAPH(Avg_Work_Participation_Mothers/standard_work_week) 
(0,000, 0,099), (0,100, 0,099), (0,200, 0,165), (0,300, 0,351), (0,400, 0,574), (0,500, 0,739), 
(0,600, 0,839), (0,700, 0,900), (0,800, 0,945), (0,900, 0,986), (1,000, 1,000) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
effect_of_CCCF_on_SFWHA[Age_Group, Number_of_Children_under_School_age, 
Income_Level] = GRAPH(childcare_cost_fraction) 
(0,000, 1,000), (0,200, 1,000), (0,400, 0,951), (0,600, 0,821), (0,800, 0,587), (1,000, 0,300), 
(1,200, 0,147), (1,400, 0,079), (1,600, 0,017), (1,800, 0,000), (2,000, 0,000) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,688), (20,0, 0,455), (30,0, 0,960), (40,0, 1,361), (50,0, 1,658), (60,0, 
1,807), (70,0, 1,881), (80,0, 1,896), (90,0, 1,926), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,688), (20,0, 0,455), (30,0, 0,960), (40,0, 1,361), (50,0, 1,658), (60,0, 
1,807), (70,0, 1,881), (80,0, 1,896), (90,0, 1,926), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,688), (20,0, 0,455), (30,0, 0,960), (40,0, 1,361), (50,0, 1,658), (60,0, 
1,807), (70,0, 1,881), (80,0, 1,896), (90,0, 1,926), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
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(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,035), (50,0, 0,455), (60,0, 
0,723), (70,0, 1,020), (80,0, 1,302), (90,0, 1,465), (100,0, 1,554) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,703), (20,0, 0,084), (30,0, 0,842), (40,0, 1,272), (50,0, 1,465), (60,0, 
1,599), (70,0, 1,688), (80,0, 1,762), (90,0, 1,807), (100,0, 1,851) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,035), (50,0, 0,455), (60,0, 
0,723), (70,0, 1,020), (80,0, 1,302), (90,0, 1,465), (100,0, 1,554) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,688), (50,0, -0,243), 
(60,0, 0,158), (70,0, 0,470), (80,0, 0,723), (90,0, 0,782), (100,0, 0,812) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,881), (20,0, -0,569), (30,0, -0,153), (40,0, 0,337), (50,0, 0,960), (60,0, 
1,272), (70,0, 1,450), (80,0, 1,629), (90,0, 1,688), (100,0, 1,688) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,688), (50,0, -0,243), 
(60,0, 0,158), (70,0, 0,470), (80,0, 0,723), (90,0, 0,782), (100,0, 0,812) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,748), (20,0, 0,203), (30,0, 0,871), (40,0, 1,391), (50,0, 1,614), (60,0, 
1,718), (70,0, 1,762), (80,0, 1,807), (90,0, 1,851), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
One_Child, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,688), (20,0, 0,455), (30,0, 0,960), (40,0, 1,361), (50,0, 1,658), (60,0, 
1,807), (70,0, 1,881), (80,0, 1,896), (90,0, 1,926), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,688), (20,0, 0,455), (30,0, 0,960), (40,0, 1,361), (50,0, 1,658), (60,0, 
1,807), (70,0, 1,881), (80,0, 1,896), (90,0, 1,926), (100,0, 1,926) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,064), (50,0, 0,366), (60,0, 
0,738), (70,0, 0,946), (80,0, 1,168), (90,0, 1,332), (100,0, 1,361) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
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(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,703), (20,0, 0,084), (30,0, 0,842), (40,0, 1,272), (50,0, 1,465), (60,0, 
1,599), (70,0, 1,688), (80,0, 1,762), (90,0, 1,807), (100,0, 1,851) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,035), (50,0, 0,455), (60,0, 
0,723), (70,0, 1,020), (80,0, 1,302), (90,0, 1,465), (100,0, 1,554) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,688), (50,0, -0,243), 
(60,0, 0,158), (70,0, 0,470), (80,0, 0,574), (90,0, 0,604), (100,0, 0,589) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,881), (20,0, -0,569), (30,0, -0,153), (40,0, 0,337), (50,0, 0,782), (60,0, 
1,168), (70,0, 1,450), (80,0, 1,614), (90,0, 1,688), (100,0, 1,688) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,688), (50,0, -0,243), 
(60,0, 0,158), (70,0, 0,470), (80,0, 0,723), (90,0, 0,782), (100,0, 0,812) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,169), (20,0, 0,361), (30,0, 0,635), (40,0, 0,826), (50,0, 0,982), (60,0, 
1,000), (70,0, 1,000), (80,0, 1,000), (90,0, 1,000), (100,0, 1,000) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,169), (20,0, 0,361), (30,0, 0,635), (40,0, 0,826), (50,0, 0,982), (60,0, 
1,000), (70,0, 1,000), (80,0, 1,000), (90,0, 1,000), (100,0, 1,000) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,169), (20,0, 0,361), (30,0, 0,635), (40,0, 0,826), (50,0, 0,982), (60,0, 
1,000), (70,0, 1,000), (80,0, 1,000), (90,0, 1,000), (100,0, 1,000) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,257), (50,0, 0,099), (60,0, 
0,441), (70,0, 0,856), (80,0, 1,168), (90,0, 1,317), (100,0, 1,317) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,703), (20,0, 0,084), (30,0, 0,842), (40,0, 1,272), (50,0, 1,465), (60,0, 
1,599), (70,0, 1,688), (80,0, 1,762), (90,0, 1,807), (100,0, 1,851) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
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(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -0,881), (30,0, -0,658), (40,0, -0,035), (50,0, 0,455), (60,0, 
0,723), (70,0, 1,020), (80,0, 1,302), (90,0, 1,465), (100,0, 1,554) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,955), (50,0, -0,554), 
(60,0, -0,213), (70,0, 0,203), (80,0, 0,545), (90,0, 0,604), (100,0, 0,649) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -0,881), (20,0, -0,480), (30,0, -0,020), (40,0, 0,396), (50,0, 0,782), (60,0, 
1,168), (70,0, 1,450), (80,0, 1,614), (90,0, 1,718), (100,0, 1,718) 
UNITS: dmnl 
effect_of_PFI_spent_on_CC_on_grandmothers_CC_hours_decisions[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income] = GRAPH(pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare) 
(0,0, -1,000), (10,0, -1,000), (20,0, -1,000), (30,0, -1,000), (40,0, -0,688), (50,0, -0,243), 
(60,0, 0,158), (70,0, 0,470), (80,0, 0,723), (90,0, 0,782), (100,0, 0,812) 
UNITS: dmnl 
UNITS: dmnl 

















































































































gender_adj_pct[Low_Income] = 0.05 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
gender_adj_pct[Medium_Income] = 0.1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 








Low_Income] = 15 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 





Low_Income] = 12 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income] = 8 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income] = 4 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = 10 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
Low_Income] = 15 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
Medium_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
High_Income] = 5 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income] = 12 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 8 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income] = 4 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = 10 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 
Low_Income] = 10 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 





High_Income] = 5 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income] = 8 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Medium_Income] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 4 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 




Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level] = standard_work_week-
INIT_Actual_CC_Hours_Covered_by_Grandmothers 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] = 10 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, Two_Children] = 9 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Low_Income, Three_Children] = 8 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] = 36 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, Two_Children] = 7 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, One_Child] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[sixteen_to_twentyfive, High_Income, Three_Children] = 3 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] = 10 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Low_Income, Two_Children] = 9 
UNITS: Hours 




INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] = 36 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, Two_Children] = 7 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, One_Child] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, High_Income, Three_Children] = 2.5 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, One_Child] = 8 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, Two_Children] = 7 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Low_Income, Three_Children] = 5 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, One_Child] = 36 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, Two_Children] = 7 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Medium_Income, Three_Children] = 6 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, High_Income, One_Child] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 
INIT_avg_WP_mothers[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, High_Income, Two_Children] = 37 
UNITS: Hours 







number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 




number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = 1 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = 2 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
number_of_childrem[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = 3 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct = 100 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] 
= MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 
Low_Income]/family_income[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income])*pct), pct) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 







High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, 
High_Income]/family_income[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income])*pct), pct) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 









High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, 




Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 









High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, 




Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 
Low_Income]/family_income[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income])*pct), pct) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 





High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, 





Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 









High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 




Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, 









High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, 




Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 
Low_Income]/family_income[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income])*pct), pct) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 





High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, 
High_Income]/family_income[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income])*pct), pct) 
UNITS: Dimensionless 
pct_of_family_income_spent_on_childcare[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 
Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 











High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, 




Low_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 









High_Income] = MIN (((weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, 

























































Three_Children, Low_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, Medium_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, High_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 
























Two_Children, Low_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Two_Children, Medium_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Two_Children, High_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, Low_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, Medium_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, High_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 
























Two_Children, Low_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Two_Children, Medium_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Two_Children, High_Income]*2)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, Low_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, Medium_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 




Three_Children, High_Income]*3)), 0) 
UNITS: Hours 
UNITS: Hours 




scenario_step = -15 
UNITS: Hours 






























self_financed_work_hours_available[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] 









self_financed_work_hours_available[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] 











self_financed_work_hours_available[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] 









self_financed_work_hours_available[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] 









self_financed_work_hours_available[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] 




self_financed_work_hours_available[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] 









self_financed_work_hours_available[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] 




































self_financed_work_hours_available[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] 









self_financed_work_hours_available[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] 





standard_work_week = 40 
UNITS: Hours 
time_to_adj_CC_hours_covered_by_grandmothers = 1.5 
UNITS: Years 
time_to_adj_hours_to_SF = 1 
UNITS: Years 
time_to_adj_work_participation = 1 
UNITS: Years 









weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[sixteen_to_twentyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[sixteen_to_twentyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 




weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[twentysix_to_thirtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, One_Child, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
One_Child, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 




weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Two_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Two_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Low_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Low_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, Medium_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, Medium_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
weekly_childcare_cost[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, Three_Children, High_Income] = MAX 
((childcare_costs_per_child_per_hour*Hours_to_Self_Finance[thirtysix_to_fourtyfive, 
Three_Children, High_Income]), 0) 
UNITS: GBP 
UNITS: GBP 
work_participation[Age_Group, Number_of_Children_under_School_age, Income_Level] = 
GRAPH(SMTH1 (total_work_hours_available, 2)) 
(0,00, 0,00), (4,00, 3,99), (8,00, 7,08), (12,00, 9,00), (16,00, 10,99), (20,00, 14,57), (24,00, 




(0,00, 0,00), (4,00, 3,99), (8,00, 7,08), (12,00, 9,00), (16,00, 10,99), (20,00, 14,57), (24,00, 
19,46), (28,00, 26,75), (32,00, 30,69), (36,00, 35,22), (40,00, 38,28) 
UNITS: Hours 
 
 
 
